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ABSTRACT 
A Coast Guard Command & Control (C2) Command Center (COMCEN) is responsible 
for managing missions, planning and executing operations, and coordinating case or 
incident responses. The success of the C2 COMCEN depends on the quality of situational 
awareness—a predominant requirement for making decisions and taking action. A key 
element to accomplish situational awareness is the evolution of rich and powerful tacit 
knowledge produced by COMCEN personnel. The creation of tacit knowledge is the 
result of accumulating information, generating explicit knowledge, and combining with 
personal experience. Experts describe tacit knowledge as a progression of knowledge 
maturity under the influences external organizational culture as it travels through 
knowledge life-cycle phases. 
Management suspects that during the course of the watch and the watch-relief 
process, knowledge is vulnerable to constraints or degradation, thus affecting the C2 
COMCEN’s ability to generate and sustain quality situational awareness. This study 
examines a C2 COMCEN environment and watch processes by making observations and 
conducting interviews for understanding influences of knowledge quality. The study also 
examines the watch environment, where knowledge originates, and how well knowledge 
flows. The literature review aids the study by providing knowledge research and studies 
from leading experts in the knowledge field. 
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The U.S. Coast Guard manages many of its maritime domain responsibilities from 
Command and Control (C2) Command Centers (COMCEN) located in various 
geographical areas about the U.S.. A C2 organization manages its specific operational 
responsibilities by the acquisition of situational awareness that leads to proper decisions 
and rightful action. In any C2 duty watch environment, there are observable evidences of 
situational awareness degradation as one watch-stander transfers the current situational 
awareness to the next. During a twelve-hour operational watch, the experience and 
knowledge a watch-stander acquires may become difficult to share during the short watch 
relief period. Information technology (IT) systems assist to facilitate the capture of 
explicit knowledge, but are not usually successful for the capture of tacit knowledge. 
Tacit knowledge is difficult to express because of the challenge to articulate and takes 
considerable time compared to explicit knowledge (Nissen 2006). Since tacit knowledge 
is necessary to perform an action, the inability to transfer tacit knowledge sufficiently 
during a watch changeover can diminish the C2 performance and adversely affect one’s 
ability to make decisions or respond effectively (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001). There 
may be several explanations for a C2 organization to experience situational awareness 
degradation such as a result of organizational knowledge management shortfalls, or 
absence of implementing knowledge principles and best practices. The Coast Guard has 
not yet explored the unique circumstances that surround knowledge behavior in an 
operational watch environment or how knowledge affects people, learning and 
operations. The purpose of this study is to examine knowledge flows within a Coast 
Guard C2 environment and discover how knowledge contributes to situational awareness. 
The study also seeks to understand how organizational behavior affects knowledge flows. 
This study focuses on a C2 organization for the extraction of observable qualitative data. 
Data collection will provide the necessary information to conduct a knowledge audit for 
examination, analysis, and conclusion. For example, how a watch-stander creates, 
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formalizes, stores, retrieves, and transfers knowledge in a manner favorable not just to 
reduce instances of lost knowledge, but how it can improve Knowledge Management 
(KM) for C2 situational awareness or any another aspect important to the management 
of C2. 
The Coast Guard has not yet explored the unique circumstances that surround 
knowledge behavior in an operational watch environment or how knowledge affects 
people, learning and operations. The purpose of this study is to examine knowledge flows 
within a Coast Guard C2 environment and to discover how knowledge contributes to 
situational awareness transfer from one Coast Guard C2 operational watch-stander to the 
next. This study also seeks to understand how organizational behavior affects knowledge 
flows. This study focuses on a specific C2 organization to extract observable qualitative 
data by conducting a knowledge audit for examination, analysis, and conclusion. For 
example, how a watch-stander creates, formalizes, stores, retrieves, and transfers 
knowledge in a manner favorable to reduce instances of lost knowledge or how it can 
improve KM for C2 situational awareness or another aspect important to the management 
of C2. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Al-Qaida terrorist attack against the American people on September 11, 
2001, (9/11) serves as a reminder to its citizens of how vulnerable the U.S. was to 
national security threats and how difficult it was (and still is) to prevent them. If the 
Coast Guard is to manage these security concerns, an increase in the maritime domain 
awareness and maritime security are necessary to protect U.S. shores from criminal 
intent. In 2002, the President and Congress created the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to meet the challenges of protecting the homeland in a period of prolific global 
terrorism. The creation of DHS combined several federal agencies, including the Coast 
Guard, to thwart or deter possible criminal action against the U.S.. It is the function of the 
C2 COMCEN to develop the necessary situational awareness to assess each national 
security threat and respond appropriately. The situational awareness at the C2 COMCEN 
level is in addition to the Coast Guard intelligence branch that gathers intelligence on all 
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Coast Guard missions to attain situational awareness at the organization level. The C2 
COMCEN situational awareness is specific to the missions and operations specific to the 
D11 AOR. 
Obtaining situational awareness in a C2 environment is essential for an 
organization to accomplish its mission or meet specific operational objectives. Making 
sense of a situation compromises several cognitive processes that begin when awareness 
allows a decision to act (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). On the other hand, several external 
factors may influence situational awareness, such as intelligence collection, 
organizational structure, job expertise, job experience, and the C2 maturity model to 
name a few. Situational awareness is the basis of which Coast Guard members make vital 
decisions that support organizational missions and execute tactics that will save lives and 
property, protect the environment, and provide security to the nation’s homeland. Since 
knowledge serves to develop situational awareness, an organization needs to understand, 
practice, and rely on an appropriate knowledge program. 
C. KNOWLEDGE IN A C2 ORGANIZATION 
The C2 operational environment encompasses all facets of knowledge from its 
creation to the sharing of tacit knowledge. Knowledge is fundamental to what we know, 
why we know it and how we use what we know. When an organization understands how 
to use knowledge and its practices become part of the daily routine, organizations 
develop an ability to use prior knowledge to recognize the value of new information, 
assimilate it and apply it to create new knowledge and capabilities (Gold, Malhotra, & 
Segars, 2001). A C2 organizational environment requires a robust knowledge 
management program to achieve situational awareness for the purpose of making 
decisions and take action. 
IT systems provide a means to capture knowledge, store, and have it always 
available for extraction at a moment’s notice. Although there are engineering limitations 
to IT systems design, Claire and Brisset (2000) provide research results of design 
knowledge repositories for intelligent decisions support systems in a C2 environment that 
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support knowledge intensive organizations. Their approach is to design an application 
that generates intelligent documentation for search and rescue (SAR) operations that use 
an engineered ontology. The purpose is to increase the value of knowledge of the 
organization and in providing knowledge workers with the right information at the right 
time. Their domain of interest—similar to the requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard— 
focuses on SAR, where controllers conduct operations to search for and rescue missing 
aircraft and vessels (Claire & Brisset, 2000). 
An example of how knowledge acquires situational awareness in a C2 
organization is when during an investigation of a given SAR incident. The relevant 
collected C2 information must support a search plan and allocate resources for rescue. 
Numerous sources provide specific details about the incident. However, the knowledge 
required to plan and execute the mission is typically part of the background knowledge of 
the C2 operators. This background knowledge and know-how are based upon standard 
operating procedures, historical information and databases, service-wide documents and 
personal experiences. Sources can exploit this information when it is formularized and 
structured appropriately. Many consider experiences to be the most valuable knowledge 
assets integrated into the organization’s memory (Claire & Brisset, 2000). 
Most people use knowledge intuitively through socialization and formal learning 
as most knowledge resides in documents as explicit knowledge or the experts’ memories 
as tacit knowledge (Claire & Brisset, 2000). In other words, we tend to use what we 
already know instead of realizing there is more to know. In some rare cases, when people 
use evidence-based self-knowledge, they will admit that they do not know what they do 
know, until they know it (Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute, 2005). Much about knowledge 
is cerebral in that it requires learning and cognitive processes to comprehend and manage. 
It is by formal processes that we learn how to apply knowledge and how will provide the 
military C2 organization a competitive advantage over its adversaries. Dalkir (2002) 
refers to learning as “an organization’s capability to gain insight and understanding from 
experience through experimentation, observation, analysis, and a willingness to examine 
both successes and failures.” In addition, the origin or source of information are not 
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always exploited efficiently for C2 Commanders to obtain all relevant information and 
make informed decisions. Research in KM has gained popularity amongst organizations 
that desire a competitive advantage. These companies promote the creation, sharing and 
leveraging of knowledge within an organization to maximize business results that also 
provide similar benefits to government C2 organizations (Claire & Brisset, 2000). 
Although not all organizations have the same knowledge concerns or level of 
requirements, this study will provide a baseline of knowledge levels for knowledge 
improvements and future studies. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study examines the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Questions:  
a. How does knowledge flow within the C2 organization? 
b. How do knowledge flows affect the transfer of situational 
awareness knowledge from one watch-stander to another? 
2. Secondary Research Questions: 
a. What behaviors within the organization may contribute to the loss 
of knowledge? 
b.  What are the influences that affect the organizational knowledge 
culture?  
c. How can the Coast Guard improve C2 situational awareness of 
what it learns from the unit’s knowledge flows? 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This research focuses on conducting a knowledge audit on a Coast Guard C2 
COMCEN and examines how their current knowledge processes affect their situational 




positions that will support the objectives of this study. Research methods from previous 
studies and literature will serve to examine the knowledge flows, relationships, and 
maturity in a watch environment.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
Chapter II is a literature review of all pertinent studies and articles relating to 
what we currently know about knowledge. It provides an understanding of what 
knowledge is, what the knowledge processes are, how to use knowledge within an 
organization and how organizational behavior contributes to the usage of knowledge. The 
information acquired also serves to provide guidance to conduct a C2 knowledge audit 
for this study. Chapter III explains the methodology used to collect data and information 
for the analysis in Chapter IV. Chapter V completes the paper with the conclusion and 
recommendations for future studies.  
G. RESEARCH BENEFITS 
The examination of knowledge in a C2 environment provides unique academic 
opportunity for learning how organizational behavior affects situational awareness. In 
addition, Observations of the watch environment can assist with understanding decisions 
that enable action. Each element of a C2 structure provides a component of the 
knowledge equation that ultimately determines the quality of knowledge within an 
organization. It is the watch environment where the generation and formation of 
organizational knowledge takes place. Management of an organization is interested in 
using knowledge acquired during a watch-stander activity because it leads to the 
knowledge enhancement and transfer of knowledge to subsequent watch-standers. 
Effective use of knowledge enables direct action in a watch environment such as correct 
decisions, appropriate behaviors and useful work (Nissen, 2006). The design of the study 
is to understand knowledge flows, identify inhibiting factors and encourage attributable 
knowledge behaviors to improve situational awareness for suitable decisions and actions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes brief background history of the Coast Guard, its missions 
and enough detail of a Coast Guard C2 COMCEN organization for rudimentary 
understanding. The Coast Guard C2 watch environment is similar to other Department of 
Defense (DoD) and federal agencies. However, enough of a difference exists that 
necessitates explaining its organizational structure and mandated missions. To understand 
how the organization uses knowledge, Chapter IV discusses specific details regarding the 
COMCEN watch environment as it pertains to the analysis of the study. 
This chapter also discusses the literature of knowledge from studies and articles to 
explain its numerous concepts known by the leading experts. The knowledge topics 
discussed will provide the background to support the analysis given in Chapter V. In 
addition to explaining knowledge concepts, the literature review serves as a basis to 
conduct a C2 knowledge audit. Understanding the fundamentals of knowledge, one can 
examine an organization’s knowledge position by comparison. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. United States Coast Guard Brief History 
In 1790, The First Congress of the United States established the Revenue Cutter 
Service to collect custom duties and prevent the smuggling of trade goods across the U.S. 
borders. This small maritime law enforcement agency acted as the nation’s maritime 
defense until the reestablishment of the Navy by Congress. As the nation grew and 
discovered new technologies, issues and concerns regarding maritime security and safety 
became more prevalent. As a result, Congress passed laws and regulations to expand the 
small service’s responsibilities. Throughout the following years, Congress consolidated 
and merged complementary federal agencies with the Revenue Cutter Service. The result 
is today’s United States Coast Guard, a unique civil and military armed force involved in 
every aspect of the United States maritime environment (U.S. Coast Guard, 2009). 
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Under the direction of DHS the U.S. Coast Guard is legislatively mandated to 
safeguard U.S. harbors, ports and waterfront facilities from accidents, negligence, 
terrorism, etc., as part of its “homeland security” mission. Moreover, as a law 
enforcement entity, the Coast Guard responds to other homeland security threats such as 
counter-narcotics operations, weapon smuggling and illegal immigration. Contrary to 
mainstream perception, the Coast Guard does not just remain on the U.S. coastline. It also 
safeguards overseas military ports and harbors to protect U.S. assets as part of its 
homeland defensive role. Its maritime homeland security, law enforcement, and 
homeland defense responsibilities cover 95,000 miles from the U.S. coastline and the 
seas out to 200 nautical miles for area of 3.4 million square miles, including 360 ports 
(McGrath, James III, 2002). 
In response to the post–9/11 security threats and expansion of Coast Guard 
responsibilities, it became necessary to restructure the organization to compensate and 
operate more effectively. The Coast Guard merged regional units into a “Sector” concept 
(centralized commander) that combined the assets and mission of several Coast Guard 
units under one Sector Commander. 
Each Sector Commander is subordinate to a larger District Commander, which 
reports to the East Coast or West Coast Area Commander depending on its geographical 
area. A Sector incorporates units such as a Coast Guard Group, Small Boat Stations, C2 
COMCENs, Marine Safety Offices, Vessel Tracking Safety units, and Captain of the 
Ports. The new Sector functions as a single-unit. As a result, the reorganization 
centralized their multi-agency nature (Customs, Immigration, commercial, local, state, 
and federal law enforcement) to a centralized approach of meeting mandated 
requirements. Figure 1 displays each of the three levels of Coast Guard command. The 
Pacific Area and Atlantic Area commands are shown with a solid North-South line that 
divides East from West in the middle of the nation where each District commander is 




Figure 1.   U.S. Coast Guard sector commands (From U.S. Coast Guard, 2007) 
2. Coast Guard C2 COMCEN Organization 
The C2 COMCEN facilitates the execution of all Coast Guard missions and 
provides valuable information and coordination capability to other governmental agency 
partners around the clock. It provides the operational commanders and the Coast Guard 
organization a professional and continuous C2 platform for coordination and enhanced 
operational effectiveness in achieving Coast Guard mission objections and for other 
federal, state, local, and private agencies operating in the maritime environment. C2 
COMCENs possess technology and communication systems to interoperate with other 





component resource used by the Coast Guard to achieve situational awareness and 
manage its mission portfolio across the broad maritime domain as shown in Figure 2 
(U.S. Coast Guard, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.   Coast Guard mission areas  (From U.S. Coast Guard, 2007) 
3. C2 COMCEN Relations 
The C2 COMCEN functions as the primary point of contact within its AOR for 
tactical maritime operations and coordination with other C2 COMCENs. C2 COMCEN 
receives requests for Coast Guard (and other maritime resources) for translation to 
maritime domain awareness (MDA), then into appropriate action. The C2 COMCEN 
maintains a variety of relationships to accomplish MDA missions, see Figure 3 (U.S. 




Figure 3.   C2 COMCEN relationships (After U.S. Coast Guard, 2007) 
a. Internal command relationships include the operational commander and 
his or her staff. The C2 COMCEN is responsible for providing the 
operational commander with the current situational awareness. 
b. C2 COMCEN hierarchy represents the direct relationship between 
subordinate C2 COMCENs acting on behalf of the operational 
commander. The relationship ensures proper communication and 
situational awareness in the management and oversight of tactical 
operations and other non-operational matters. 
c. External partner relationships include partners from the DoD, federal 
agencies, private maritime industry, international governments, non-
governmental organizations (NGO), state and local governments. 
d. Operational Units are the deployable resources assigned to a specific 
AOR subordinate to the operational commander. 
12 
 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The mission challenges of the 21st century have increased significantly due to the 
dynamics of changing world events. Today’s missions differ from traditional military 
missions as U.S. policy emphasizes a change from hard-power to soft-power, including 
how missions operate and manage resources. Today’s missions are simultaneously more 
complex and more dynamic, which requires the collective effort of all government and 
civilian agency capabilities to succeed. The advent of new concepts of operations, fresh 
approaches to organizational C2 processes, and the implementation of cutting-edge IT 
systems have resulted from an increase of capabilities that provide a significant increase 
beyond the ability manage these challenges (Alberts & Hayes, 2006). 
There is a consensus that most military leaders cannot agree on a definition of 
what C2 is and how to use it. However, many do agree on its common characteristics: A 
C2 environment has a hierarchy with a senior person or unit commander in command, 
which is responsible for its operations (Pigeau & McCann, 2002). Obtaining data, 
information, and knowledge from both internal and external relationships will generate 
situational awareness. From this position, the senior commander attempts to control a 
specific situation or problem using subordinate commands at his or her disposal. The 
formulation of knowledge from data, information, and knowledge collection processes in 
a C2 operational environment requires knowledge-intensive activities. Most knowledge 
resides in informal documents or in the minds of experts. This prevents proper 
formalization of available information. This result is the inappropriate exploitation by C2 
commanders to obtain relevant information and make informed decisions (Claire & 
Brisset, 2000). 
Network-centric operations is a successful method to attain situational awareness. 
Network-centric operations have a two-step process: First, achieving shared awareness 
and second, leveraging shared awareness to achieve a greater degree of self-
synchronization for increases in agility and effectiveness. The magic is the emergence of 
self-synchronizing behavior. Like many of our coalition partners within the DoD, 
investment in network-centric warfare builds a robust, secure, ubiquitous infrastructure of 
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IT systems and command structures. As a result, the coming years will see an increase in 
the quality of service and interoperability. The DoD data strategy is to facilitate and 
encourage widespread information sharing and collaboration of these steps (Alberts and 
Hayes, 2006). 
In addition to network-centric warfare, several factors influence situational 
awareness, such as information gathering, organizational structure, expertise, job 
experience, and knowledge maturity. It applies to the Coast Guard as a basis for which 
Coast Guard members make vital decisions to support organizational missions and 
execute tactics that save lives, protect property, protect the environment, and provide 
security to our homeland. Since knowledge serves to develop situational awareness, it is 
imperative that knowledge processes become clearly understood, practiced, and 
implemented. 
D. DECISION MAKING 
Obtaining situational awareness in a C2 environment enables decision making, 
which in turn enables an organization to take action and accomplish its mission or meet 
specific objectives (Nissen, 2006). The sense of our reality is comprised of several 
cognitive processes. It is when awareness reaches a certain level and ends at a point 
where a decision to act is achieved (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). Moreover, decision-making 
has proportional consequences based on the importance of the problem. Take, for 
example, a sailboat at sea taking on water. The current situational awareness may contain 
limited information such as sea state, approximate position of the vessel, number of 
people on board, weather status, tides and currents, and how long people can survive in 
the water. How a decision is made is based on this information with other external 
information, such as, the type of response (aircraft or vessel), arrival time on the scene 
and type of medical assistance required. Once the course of action is decided, all further 
decisions will result from new information or change of circumstances. A C2 
organization needs a firm grasp how knowledge is created, obained, and formalized. 
Otherwise, it would lack the coherent vision to manage and integrate knowledge 
processes, information processes and information technologies (Choo, 1996). 
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Zeleny (2006) provides the process of how decisions are made. Decision-making 
is a process of several important questions answered. What is to be decided and who 
makes the decision? What is the process of making decisions? In addition, why there is a 
specific decision for acceptance and implementation? Prior to making a decision, an 
organization collects unbiased and objective information problem, its contexts, and 
scope. After the collection of data, the search begins for relevant information known as 
the information stage. During the knowledge stage starts an engagement process of 
cognitive analysis. Evaluation of alternatives and comparisons determine decision criteria 
and prioritize data as relevant or not. The coordination of activities leads toward a 
purpose of determining a course of action, decision, or problem solution. In this stage, an 
attempt is made to determine which decision-making activities will achieve the purpose. 
In the post decision stage, an attempt to justify the decision by answering the why 
question, of its preference and implementation. Then, after an organization gathers 
additional information for preparation, the wisdom stage is the next step in the decision-
making cycle. Affirmation knowledge and wisdom stages are natural processes in quality 
decision-making. An organization wants to know what, how and why decision-making 
activities happen and why its implementation as summarized in Table 1. 
. 
Information Stage Define the ‘what’ by accumulating unbiased, objective 
information about the problem. 
Knowledge Stage Determine the ‘how’ by identifying a course of action 
based on coordinated analysis activities 
Wisdom Stage Justify decision by answer ‘why’ the course of action 
chosen and gather additional information for further 
decisions. 
Table 1.   Summarization of decision-making stages 
Zeleny (2006) explains that knowledge refers to the process of inputs through 
coordination of action. These rules of coordination (sequences, patterns, levels of 
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performance), are derived from the knowledge characteristics (not information) of 
experience, observation, consequences or social prescription. It is the rules that determine 
the formation of knowledge (Zeleny, 2006). Organizational decision-making is complex, 
messy and no doubt a vital part of organizational life: “All organizational actions are 
initiated by decisions, and all decisions are commitments to action” (Choo, 1996). 
E. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 
A precise definition of knowledge has eluded a standard agreement of scholars 
and philosophers. On the other hand, they commonly agree that knowledge is a matter of 
one’s own perception. There is little argument that knowledge is a complex autonomous 
discerning process of reasoning skills and experience. This distinguishes the cognitive 
process from opinions, speculations, beliefs, or other categories of unproven information 
(Liebeskind, 1996). Plato defined knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ a concept debated 
over the centuries by numerous philosophers. Erudition of these debates suggests that 
knowledge originates as information before its productive use as knowledge (Rowley, 
2007). Depending on context, knowledge as a resource is always located within the 
individual, group, or process (De Long and Fahey, 2000). “Knowledge should refer to the 
observer’s distinction through which one brings forth the background of experience as a 
coherent and self-consistent set of coordinating actions” (Zeleny, 1987). Knowledge 
cannot be separated from the process of knowing (establishing relationships) since 
knowledge and knowing is a knowledge process (Zeleny, 2006). Understanding what 
knowledge is and how to use it in a C2 environment is an absolute certainty for decision-
making. 
According to De Long and Fahey (2000), there are at least three specific types of 
knowledge: 
Human Knowledge:  What individuals know or know how to do. People possess 
individual knowledge known as skills or expertise, which is a combination of explicit and 
tacit knowledge. This type of knowledge is located throughout the body such as knowing 
how to ride a bike, or is cognitive that is conceptual and abstract. 
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Social Knowledge:  This form of knowledge exists with the sharing of 
knowledge of individuals or groups through relationships. Social or collective knowledge 
is typically tacit, shared by group members and develops only through collaboration. 
Structured Knowledge: Structured knowledge is integrated throughout the 
organization by processes, tools and routines. In this form, knowledge is explicit and has 
a basis on rules. It is different from human knowledge and social knowledge as it is 
considered an organizational resource that exits independently of human knowers. 
F. KNOWLEDGE FOR A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Competitive advantage is at the heart of an organization’s performance in 
competitive markets relying on the implementation of broad generic strategies (Porter, 
1980). Generally, competitive advantage refers to the private sector perspective of how it 
obtains a higher value over similar product or service producing organizations. However, 
a competitive strategy for the U.S. military requires no less an active approach against its 
challengers. It is imperative for the U.S. military to maintain an advantage in all sectors 
and factors of national defense. This includes a C2 environment where assessments of 
necessary consequences are routinely decided. The management of knowledge has 
become critical for instituting competitive advantage and has evolved into an 
organizational strategy by management (Gupta & McDaniel, 2002). 
A recent trend in the field of strategic management is the emphasis of 
organizational knowledge as a basis of competitive advantage between organizations. 
Empirical findings support the case for organizational resources as the center of 
competitive advantage. The development of competitive advantage resources as a priority 
is a valuable asset for any organization (Argote, 2000). Therefore, in order for a 
competitive advantage resource to materialize, it must be difficult for competitors to 
imitate (Lippman and Rumelt, 1992). Nissen (2006) states that knowledge resources are 
usually arduous to imitate and are socially complex thus capable of long-term sustainable 
competitive advantage: “Knowledge represents one of the few bases of sustainable 
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competitive advantages available to the modern enterprise, but knowledge is distributed 
unevenly through most organizations” (Nissen, 2006). 
G. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
Knowledge Management (KM) systems take on a new importance in economics 
where it is seen as a competitive factor for individuals, corporations, and nations. The 
reality of this driving force is what supports the development of broad adoption and 
continuation of powerful methods and tools to manage knowledge (Wiig, 1997). 
Knowledge Management originates from the idea that its very purpose and value has a 
basis on knowing that valuable knowledge exists. All one needs to do is capture, codify 
and share it. That is, to enhance the deployment of knowledge into practice through 
taking appropriate steps to permeate the minds of the organizational members who need 
it (McElroy, 2002). Leaders of progressive organizations seek active ways to create and 
drive value from knowledge assets. These efforts are championed by people with strong 
personal beliefs and convictions that desire success. In the absence of a specific KM 
strategy to create and integrate knowledge in the organization, tools such as information 
systems facilitate the transfer of knowledge and information sharing, but have minimal 
effect at best. The result inspires organizations to implement the design of information 
systems specifically to perform the codification, collection, integration and dissemination 
of organizational knowledge (Alavi & Leidner, 1999). 
KM provides a system in which an organization’s employees use knowledge 
processes in addition to the knowledge at their disposal. The purpose is to perform an 
assortment of knowledge activities. The activities typically include, at a minimum, 
acquiring knowledge from external sources of the organization, selecting knowledge 
from within the organization, and creating new knowledge as an integrated process. The 
product introduces a new internalization of knowledge that benefits the organization 
(Holsapple and Joshi, 2000). A well-defined knowledge management system has the 




H. KNOWLEDGE HIERARCHY 
The development of several hierarchical descriptions of knowledge appeared over 
time which apply to either the individual or organization. In an organizational 
environment, a richer taxonomy is required to contain some of the complexity 
involvement in storing and sharing knowledge (Johnson, Lorenz, & Lundvall, 2002). 
This section contains three different, but similar knowledge hierarchy models for 
comparison by leading knowledge academics. The models provide an understanding of 
their unique perspectives of different levels of knowledge development. It begins with the 
most fundamental elements, then building upon each step, creates a higher complex level 
of maturity. 
1. Zeleny Knowledge Hierarchy Model 
Zeleny (2006) describes knowing as an evolution of progression towards wisdom. 
Although the idea or perspective of wisdom is full of substantial and significant 
philosophical meanings, wisdom needs to be to be pragmatic, practical, and useful. As a 
resource, wisdom management fosters organizational efficiency, effectiveness and 
positive ethical conduct. Zeleny (2006) describes his knowledge hierarchy analogous to 
baking bread. 
Data (Know-nothing): Elements or parts that by themselves that have little 
meaning such as H2O, yeast bacteria, and starch molecules. It has the effect of muddling 
through since it lacks context and meaning. 
Information (Know-what): The interpretation of a sequence of elements or in this 
example, ingredients such as flour, water, sugar, spices, and a recipe. It has the effect of 
efficiency. 
Knowledge (Know-how): Coordination processes that produce results such as 
baking the ingredients into a loaf of bread. It supports effectiveness. 
Wisdom (Know-why): Why one does it, such as making white bread and 




Many people are informed and know what to do; quite a few people are 
knowledgeable and know how to do it. Only a few wise people can fully explicate the 
meaning of why it done (Zeleny, 2006). Figure 4 demonstrates the progress of Zeleny’s 
knowledge hierarchy model. As the maturity of knowledge compounds upon the previous 
level, the knowledge has more purpose and more effect towards usefulness. 
 
Figure 4.   Zeleny Knowledge Hierarchy Model (After Zeleny, 2006) 
2. Nissen Knowledge Hierarchy Model 
Nissen (2006) explains the uniqueness of data, information, and knowledge by 
describing their differences as it applies to the hierarchy model. There are three levels of 
knowledge hierarchy, each one builds upon the level below it. Data can reduce 
uncertainty and ambiguity of a problem and results with the production of information. 
However, information is more than just the sum of its parts. It must have context to attain 
meaning of the message. Information assists people to make sense of their environment 




than data, knowledge involves more than just information. It requires semantics and 
pragmatics of knowledge in context for decision-making enablement and direct action 
(Nissen, 2006). 
Nissen (2006) uses the analogy of sending an e-mail message to explain his view 
of the knowledge hierarchy. 
Data (Symbols): An e-mail message with the understandable characters “333/33,” 
but, without some kind of comparable context, the characters have no meaning or 
reference. 
Information (Context): The e-mail now contains the statement ‘blood pressure 
333/33.’ Now there is context for the message and gives it meaning. One now knows 
what the data represents but without intimate knowledge, the information does not allow 
action. 
Knowledge (Supports action): You hear from your physician that explains what 
the information represents. If the first number is above 200 and if the second number is 
below 60, there are serious health concerns. The knowledge can now enable action as a 
response to the health problem. 
Nissen demonstrates his knowledge hierarchy model in Figure 5, using two 
dimensions of abundance and action ability to differentiate between three descriptions of 
data, information, and knowledge. Data resides at the bottom level with information 
about the middle and knowledge at the top. On a grand scale, the amount data available is 
much more prevalent than in comparison with the amount knowledge it generates. The 





Figure 5.   Nissen Knowledge Hierarchy Model (After Nissen, 2002) 
3. Ackoff Knowledge Hierarchy Model 
Russel Ackoff (Bellinger et al., 2004) promotes the knowledge hierarchy as the 
human mind divided into five categories. The first four categories relate to the past of 
what has been or already known. The fifth category, wisdom, relates to the future. To 
achieve wisdom, one must successfully accomplish each preceding category. Bellinger et 
al. (2004) provides the following elaboration of Ackoff’s definition of the five knowledge 
categories. 
Data (Symbols, no understanding): No significant meaning beyond its existence 
due to lack of context. It may exist under any form, whether usable or not.  
Information (Who, What, Where and When): Data with meaning through a 
relationship of connections. The meaning is useful, but necessarily so. 
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Knowledge (How, understanding of relations): A collection of information 
intended to be useful through a deterministic process. Having knowledge does not infer 
additional knowledge growth from itself.  
Wisdom (Evaluated understanding, understanding principles): Wisdom is an 
extrapolative and non-probabilistic process, an iterative activity from all previous levels 
of knowledge. It generates discernment and judgment. 
Understanding (Why): Is a cognitive and analytical process where knowledge 
amalgamates into new knowledge. The difference between understanding and knowledge 
is the same as the difference between learning and memorizing. People with 
understanding can undertake useful action because of their ability to synthesize new 
knowledge or new information. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the relationships and sequences of Ackoff’s hierarchy 
model. Connections describe the relationships and direction from data to wisdom as 
understanding applies to each knowledge level. 
 
Figure 6.   Ackoff’s Knowledge Hierarchy Model (After Bellinger et al. 2004) 
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Comparing the Zeleny, Nissen, and Ackoff models, we have a clearer 
representation and understanding of the knowledge hierarchies. How knowledge 
progresses through the stages from bits of meaningless data to supporting action as 
shown in Table 2. This framework provides us with the basis to understand the activities 




Zeleny Nissen Ackoff 
Data Know-nothing 
Symbols – no 
meaning 
Symbols -  no 
meaning 
Information Know-what Context 





How – understanding 
relations 
Understanding   Why 
Wisdom Know-why   
Table 2.   Summarization of Zeleny, Nissen and Ackoff (2006) knowledge hierarchy 
stages 
I. TACIT VERSUS EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE 
Smith (2001) and Hansen et al. (1999) explain that personal experience conveys 
tacit (know-how) knowledge, whereas explicit knowledge (know-what) is obtained 
through codification, and writing as known throughout recorded history. Historically, 
capital, materials, and labor were more valuable than creating and applying knowledge. 
However, the information age and the knowledge revolution generated a need for 
imaginative, intuitive, and inspirational leaders who can manage human intelligence for 
conversion into useful products and services (Smith, 2001). 
The differences between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge is commonly 
explained as what can be codified versus what is known, but cannot be articulated. 
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Explicit knowledge is expressed in words and numbers and shared in the form of data, 
scientific formulae, manuals, documents, etc. This kind of knowledge is easily 
transmitted between individuals formally and systematically (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). 
Whereas tacit knowledge is embedded knowledge that resides in people and is produced 
by people. Tacit knowledge is also personal knowledge commonly acquired through 
situational experience, deeply rooted in action and in specific context (Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2001). Tacit knowledge has come to be referred as broad know-how 
knowledge that is hidden or implicit within an organization. Formalized (explicit) 
knowledge located in documents, processes and databases only represents a small 
fraction of what an organization knows (Horvath 2000). For an organization to benefit 
from tacit knowledge, it needs to know how to harness know-how knowledge and share it 
within the organization for observable benefits. 
Horvath (2000), explains several reasons why tacit knowledge over explicit 
knowledge benefits organizations: 1. Innovation; sparking new ideas from personal 
experiences. If ideas become codified and structured into processes, they tend to inhibit 
creativity. 2. Best Practices; the explicitness of actual problems and real situations when 
combined with tacit knowledge tends to reflect how work actually gets done. In many 
instances, what is optimal for practice is not found in documentation but rather resides 
within the person. Tacit knowledge has a unique value added by the people that generate 
it. It emerges from their particular situations, skills and experiences that when combined, 
it provides a powerful capability for that organization (Horvath, 2000). 
Nonaka and Konno (1998) explain that tacit and explicit knowledge can create 
new knowledge through a spiraling process of interactions. Moreover, that a combination 
of tacitness and explicitness make it possible to conceptualize four conversion patterns. 
Taken from Nonaka’s and Knono’s (1998) SECI model (Socialization, Externalization, 
Combination, and Internalization) in Figure 7, shows the characteristics of the four steps 
in the conversion process. The SECI model is abstract and serves only as an outline of 




Figure 7.   SECI model (From Nonaka and Konno 1998) 
Socialization: Socialization involves sharing of tacit knowledge between 
individuals (Nonaka & Konno 1998) or groups (Nissen, 2002) as an exchanged of joint 
activities such as living or working in the same environment rather than through written 
or verbal instructions. Apprenticeships are relationships that typically consist of years of 
sharing and understanding the ways of thinking and feeling. One must allow for an 
environment of trust and openness for tacit knowledge sharing. Socialization involves 
capturing knowledge through physical proximity largely supported through direct 
interaction. Knowledge distribution is another key aspect of socialization such as 
transferring one’s ideas or images directly to other people (Nonaka and Konno, 1998). 
The model illustrates two individuals sharing knowledge through socialization within a 
joint activity (Nonaka & Konno 1998). 
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Externalization: Externalization requires the expression of tacit knowledge, and 
its translation into forms understood by others. During this stage of the knowledge-
creation process, an individual commits to the group and then becomes one with the 
group. The sum of the individual’s intentions integrates with the group thus exchanging 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Externalization is support by two key factors: 
First, articulation of tacit knowledge (conversion of tacit to explicit) such as metaphors, 
analogies or narratives. The second factor involves translating the tacit knowledge of 
experts through deductive/inductive reasoning or creative inference into explicit forms 
easy to understand (Nonaka and Konno, 1998). The model illustrates individuals fused 
into an interactive group that transfer tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. 
Combination: Combination involves the conversion of explicit knowledge into a 
more complex set of explicit knowledge of key issues for communication and diffusion in 
a systematization process. From the fresh knowledge generated during the externalization 
phase, it transcends to the group. The combination phase consists of three processes: 
First, the capture and integration of new explicit knowledge is essential such as collecting 
externalized knowledge (public data) either inside or outside the organization, then 
combining the data. Second, is the dissemination of explicit knowledge by transferring it 
directly through presentations or meetings. Third, involves editing or processing explicit 
knowledge, which makes it more usable (e.g., documents, plans, reports, and market 
data.). The combination process provides the justification and basis for agreement that 
facilitates organizational members to take practical steps (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). 
Internalization: Internalization of newly created knowledge is the conversion of 
explicit knowledge into the organizations’ tacit knowledge. Each individual identifies the 
knowledge relevant for him or her within the organizational, typically a result of 
learning-by-doing. Individuals who train and exercise can access the knowledge realm of 
the group and throughout the entire organization. Internalization relies on two 
dimensions. First, explicit knowledge translates concepts or methods about strategy, 
tactics, innovation, or improvement. An example is how training programs in 
organizations help trainees to understand the organization and themselves as part of the 
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whole (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). The model illustrates the conversion of explicit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge within the organization. 
Nonaka’s and Konno’s SECI model describes the dynamic processes in which 
explicit and tacit knowledge are exchanged and transformed when knowledge is 
socialized, externalized, combined, and internalized within an organization. A benefit of 
the model in a C2 environment is a better understanding of how new knowledge is 
created, converted and distributed with individuals and groups within an organization. 
This knowledge can provide guidance for when and where learning and training should 
take place, the generation, and capture of knowledge, or perhaps the right time and place 
for implemented information. 
J. KNOWLEDGE LIFE CYCLE 
The knowledge life cycle model links all aspects of knowledge together in a 
knowledge management system of processes (Nissen, Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000). It is 
about getting the right information to the right people at the time with capturing and 
codifying tacit and explicit knowledge before it leaves the organization (McElroy, 2002). 
The knowledge life cycle provides a sequence of iterative steps to assist the knowledge 
manager with numerous knowledge designs such as information systems or designing an 
organization for knowledge competitive advantage. Drawing from Nissen, Kamel, and 
Sengupta, (2000) we begin to view how knowledge flows through an organization. 
Knowledge life cycles are generally iterative processes of repetitive life cycle 
phases. Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta, (2000) compares several proposed life cycles 
through research scholars by sharing similarities and creating a unified model as shown 
in Table 3. The Amalgamated table integrates the fundamental concepts and terms from 






Model Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Nissen Capture Organize Formalize Distribute Apply  
Depress and 
Chauvel 
Create Map/Bundle Store Share/Transfer Reuse Evolve 
Gartner 
Group 
Create Organize Capture Access Use  
Davenport 
and Prusak 
Generate  Codify Transfer   
Amalgamated Create Organize Formalize Distribute Apply Evolve 
Table 3.   Comparison life-cycle phases for Nissen, Depress and Chauvel, Gartner 
Group, Davenport and Prusak (After Nissen, Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000) 
Knowledge Creation: Beginning with phase one, knowledge creation involves 
discovery in the development of new knowledge. Knowledge capturing requires only that 
the knowledge be original to a particular individual or organization (Nissen, Kamel, & 
Sengupta, 2000). A C2 environment captures knowledge in much of the same manner as 
creating or generating. Whether it is the discovery of the adversary’s location, troop 
movement or an intention, C2 obtains knowledge through, intelligence collection and 
critical indicator analysis. Within an organization, knowledge creation teams or projects 
represent a key role in value creation (Nonaka & Konno, 1998). The Amalgamated 
model, therefore, seems more complete with its beginning of the creation step. 
Knowledge Organization: In phase two, knowledge organization and 
formulation arises from the facilitation of knowledge sharing. Numerous technologies 
assist classification and clustering of knowledge through a broad range of technology and 
practices, including knowledge maps and semantic networks of knowledge concepts 
(Nissen, Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000). Knowledge is intangible, has no boundaries, and is 
dynamic. If not usable at a particular time in a specific place, it has no present value. 
Therefore, the use of knowledge requires a concentration of knowledge resources at a 
certain space and time. In other words, sharing of knowledge organizationally means that 
the staff can apply and develop necessary useful knowledge when it is needed. (Nonaka 
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and Konno, 1998). COMCENs use various information technology systems (e.g., 
database applications) to collect, categorize and share knowledge within the C2 
organization and with external friendly agencies with similar interests. 
Knowledge formalization: Phase three uses different terms (store, capture, 
codify and formalize) across each of the models, but they all address some sort of 
mechanism for making knowledge formal or explicit (Nissen, 2002). An organization 
exerts a continuous effort to formalize operating skills and experiences into objective 
knowledge through codification. The goal is to reduce and eliminate uncertainty in the 
operating tasks or seal off the operating core from its disruptive environment. 
Management is responsible for formulating written rules, procedures, and performance 
standards where knowledge is stored for organizational usage. An organization relies on 
information systems for knowledge aggregation and structure. However, a large part of 
tacit knowledge is lost in the formalization because of its difficulty to articulate (Lam, 
2000). 
Knowledge distribution: Phase four describes the necessity to transfer 
knowledge among individuals within an organization. Transfer within organizations is 
the process through which one group, department or division for example is affected by 
the experience of another (Argote, 2000). Knowing who should know what or to what 
level of detail is critical for making knowledge available and usable across the 
organization (Porbst, 1998). Important tasks of management can facilitate the process of 
interactions between organizational members. It makes them sensitive towards the 
environmental stimulus so that knowledge amplification and internalization contribute to 
the organization (Bhatt, 2000). 
Knowledge Application: Three of the four models include a fifth phase for 
application, use or reuse of knowledge for solving problems or making decisions (Nissen, 
2002). Organizational learning occurs when the organizational components obtain 
knowledge and recognize its potential usefulness (Huber, 1991). Peter Drucker (1993) 
explains that knowledge is the only meaningful economic resource of the post-capitalist 
or knowledge society. The correct role of management is to ensure the application and 
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performance of knowledge-to-knowledge exchange (Choo, 1996). Bhatt (2000) explains 
the possibilities of knowledge adoption from external sources. However, knowledge 
imitation is not easy such as in the past where Japanese companies imitated knowledge 
from western competitors for their own advantage. 
Knowledge Evolution: In phase six, Depres and Chauvel include a sixth element 
called evolution, which defines the refinement and continuous development of all 
knowledge at that point. Knowledge evolution when taken to the next phase returns to 
creation phase one of the iteration process thereby completing the life cycle (Nissen, 
Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000).  
The model is more readily discernible when presented as a cyclical life cycle 
model, Figure 8, (Nissen, Kamel, & Sengupta, 2000) versus the linear sequence noted 
above. Two distinct classes separate the model: Class I, sharing includes knowledge 
organization, formalization and distribution, which are activities supported from extant 
information technologies for a localized view of knowledge management. Class II, non-
sharing activities do not correspond well with support from extant information 
technologies, which are performative in nature. This class applies evolution, creation and 
application in the enterprise performance aspect of knowledge management activities 




Figure 8.   Cyclical life-cycle model (From Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta, 2000). 
A knowledge life cycle within an organization is the process identified by 
creation, organization, formalization, distribution, and application. Eventually, the 
knowledge evolves to the point of creating of new knowledge. The organization chooses 
different strategies for each phase to foster knowledge optimization and accomplish 
shared goals. The challenge is for organizations to create an environment that demands 
and facilitates the generation and process of information. 
The importance of knowledge spiraling is often due to its processes, which bring 
forth new perspectives on individual knowledge. Knowledge actuation within the 
organizational knowledge base transpires by checking its validity through debates and 
critiques at the group level (Weick, 1979). As an individual becomes a part of an 
organization, sharing of knowledge occurs for enhancing both the individual and 
organization. The integration between both individual and organization not only increases 




K. KNOWLEDGE FLOWS 
The modern C2 environment is confronted with numerous obstacles to overcome 
as it struggles to obtain situational awareness in real-time to meet operational objectives. 
Information technology systems have the capacity to hold terabytes of data and the 
capability of delivery large amounts of information over computer networks almost 
instantaneously. Information flows such as intelligence reports, surveillance data, 
imagery and communications, surpass the ability of any commend center to analyze 
properly in an era where events change rapidly and quickly. Many incorrectly regard 
information management with knowledge management. Although IT systems provide 
valuable explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge is required for true situational awareness. 
Any lag in response to a situation is detrimental to a successful and timely response. If 
the life cycle of knowledge is to be of any use for C2 competitive advantage, it must 
enable effective action, which drives superior performance (Nissen, 2006). Therefore, 
knowledge flows are vital for communicating data, information and knowledge between 
individuals or groups for sharing, learning, generating, storing, retrieving and allocation. 
The primary objective of knowledge flows is to transfer what is known from 
where it resides to where it is needed across space, time and organization. In other words 
knowledge is most effective when it is the disired knowledge, in the right place, at the 
right time. However, knowledge is not evenly distributed throughout the enterprise. This 
causes organizations to clump their knowledge thus restricting its flow. When an 
organization relies on the distribution of knowledge to know how to do what they need to 
do, knowledge clumping (without appropriate processes to allow knowledge to flow 
freely) can have a crippling effect on its operations (Nissen, 2001). Tacit knowledge 
flows are sticky, clumpy and slow, but often considered the most valuable resource 
within an organization when experiences combine existing knowledge (Nissen, 2006). 
Examining knowledge clumping in a C2 environment provides insight into inhibition of 
knowledge and how it affects knowledge flows. 
Nissen (2006) describes the concept of knowledge flows as movements of 
knowledge across people, organizations, places and times between two knowledge 
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hierarchies shown in Figure 9. On the left, knowledge begins with the producer’s source 
of knowledge as it travels through each layer of the knowledge life cycle until it is 
received by the consumer and formulated into tacit knowledge. Beginning with tacit 
knowledge, the producer articulates and codifies what he or she knows from learning into 
explicit knowledge, which enables action. The producer then uses this knowledge to 
create information for the production of data, which are in turn transmitted via signals 
across a physical space. The consumer interprets the data, develops viable information 
from semantics and context and next formulates actionable knowledge by learning 
(Nissen, 2007). 
 
Figure 9.   Knowledge flows (After Nissen, 2007) 
Knowledge transfer is more successful within organizations than between 
organizations. The argument is that knowledge sharing is more effective in an 
environment of relationships and trust (Ibrahim, Shumate, Levitt, & Contractor, 2006). A 
manager’s endeavor to improve and foster an environment that facilitates knowledge 
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flows within an organization improves competitive advantage. Grant (1996) proposes 
four mechanisms to coordinate the integration of knowledge within an organization:  
1. Rules and directives enable the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge.  
2. Sequence the workflow process to minimize communication but ensures 
the input of an expert on a different time slot.  
3. Create routines to support complex patterns of interactions between 
individuals where no guidance exists or there is a lack of communication.  
4. Establish a group problem solving and decision-making. 
An organization’s work in a global environment transcends nations, races, 
religions, businesses, and cultures. Differences can impede the ability to sustain 
knowledge flows and thus degrade competitive performance. Managing knowledge 
flows, diagnosing and dissolving intercultural knowledge clumps and clots that impede 
knowledge circulation, is critical to one’s competitive advantage (Nissen, 2007). 
Several dimensional attributes prominently affect knowledge flows over space 
and time. Take, for example, Nissen’s (2006) four-dimensional knowledge flow diagram 
in Figure 10 that demonstrates knowledge flows within an organization. The explicit axis 
characterizes the degree of knowledge articulation in explicit form. The reach axis 
characterizes the level of knowledge socialization. The life cycle axis characterizes the 
knowledge stage of activity. The fourth dimension is flow time, which pertains to the 
length of time required for knowledge to move through the coordinates when considering 
the application of attributes of each of the three axes. The lines represent the length of 
time it takes for knowledge to flow. Thick lines represent slow movement and thin lines 




Figure 10.   Multidimensional knowledge-flow visualization (From Nissen, 2006) 
Point A is the representation of tacit knowledge created by an individual. The 
socialization flow (A–B) reflects a movement of tacit knowledge across the reach 
dimension to the group level. The externalization flow (B–C) reflects a movement from 
tacit to explicit knowledge at this group level. The combination flow (C–D) reflects in 
turn a movement of explicit knowledge across the reach dimension to the organization 
level. In terms of flow time, notice the use of a thinner arrow to represent a combination 
flow as only explicit knowledge that travels more quickly  (Nissen, Kamel, and 
Sengupta).The internalization flow (D–E) reflects a movement from explicit to tacit 
knowledge at this organization level. Finally, we include a (reverse) socialization flow 
from Points E to B (i.e., tacit knowledge moving from the organization to the group level) 
to complete the one loop (Nissen 2006). 
Knowledge flows over space and time are affected by these four dimensional 
factors. Tacit knowledge gained through experience and learning takes longer to acquire 
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than explicit knowledge obtained codified in the form of a written manual, and much 
longer than information or data. In addition, the more people within the organization 
required to obtain the knowledge the longer the process. Generally, the rule of thumb is 
that the longer it takes to acquire knowledge, the more tacit the knowledge is and much 
richer for enabling action (Nissen 2006). 
L. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Organizational learning is the influx of new knowledge in specific competitive 
fields that promotes an organization to gain competitive advantage (Edmondson, 2008). 
However, producing and processing knowledge has become a central challenge to 
organizations (Schulz, 2001). There are narrow concepts as to what organizational 
learning is or the proper method for implementation. Scientists and educators think of 
organizational learning as an intentional process directed to improve effectiveness. 
Enhancement of organizational effectiveness must occur to claim organizational learning 
has taken place (Huber, 1991).  
Learning refers to knowledge in motion, the movement of knowledge between 
people, organizations, places, and times, as it is a characterization of creation or 
acquisition of new knowledge. However, it is only in the perspective of the individual to 
consider knowledge as new (Nissen 2006). Similarly, Nonaka (1991) states that rather 
than focusing on learning, he focuses on knowledge creation as a subset of learning. 
Knowledge flows within an organization are expected to be highly functional in the sense 
that they contribute to value that is readily identifiable. Knowing and learning are tightly 
interrelated activities and strongly connected by the knowledge-based activity of doing. 
Huber (1991) provides us with his understanding of organizational learning. He 
elaborates on four constructs that integrally link to organizational learning (knowledge 
acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational 
memory). Intentional learning is a focal process of organizational learning for scientist 
and academics, which tends toward improving effectiveness. It is important to challenge 
these concepts since narrow conceptions decrease the chances of discovering useful 
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findings or ideas. Learning does not always increase the learner’s effectiveness or 
potential effectiveness but instead, learning may result from new and significant insights 
and awareness that attain no behavioral change. The critical element in learning is that we 
can be consciously aware of differences and alternatives for our own choosing. The 
choices may not tend to reconstruct our behavior but rather change one’s cognitive maps 
or understandings (Huber 1991). 
Edmonson (2008) places emphasis on execution-as-learning approach to 
organizational learning that promotes success over the long haul. A company that 
constantly evaluates its activities, discovers means of improvement with a built in 
mechanism learning as an expectation, can become a successful and adaptive 
organization. Edmonson (2008) states there are four unique day-to-day approaches of 
execution-as-learning. First, use the best knowledge obtainable to inform the design of 
specific process guidelines. Second, enable employees to collaborate by making 
information available when and where it is needed. Third, regularly use a capture process 
to measure and evaluate the accomplishments of work. Fourth, study the collected data in 
an effort to find ways for improvement. These four practices become the basis of a 
learning infrastructure that becomes the backbone of the organization, making continuous 
learning part of the daily routine. 
Edmonson (2008) explains how the best organizations have figured out how to 
learn quickly while maintaining high-quality standards. Fostering psychological safety 
provides a means necessary to ensure avoiding penalization when asking for assistance or 
admitting a mistake. Psychological safety is crucial within organizations where 
knowledge constantly changes, where employees need to collaborate, and where workers 
must make decisions without intervention from the management. One should realize that 
no one could perform perfectly in every situation when knowledge and best practices 
change regularly. Psychological safety does not operate at the expense of the employee’s 
accountability (Edmondson, 2008). The most efficacious organization can achieve high 







































Figure 11.   Organizational effectiveness (After Edmonson, 2008). 
Organizations that adapt to an execution-as-learning model do not place their 
focus on being more effective than competitors, but rather on faster learning. The goal is 
to discover what works and what does not. Employees must obtain new knowledge while 
executing. Edmonson’s research (Edmondson, 2008) describes four steps to accomplish 
this objective: 
Step 1: Provide Process Guidelines. Establish best practices gathered from 
experts, publications, and competitors. Not necessarily produce efficiency, but to promote 
organizational learning. Most effective knowledge organizations recognize that best 
practice is an evolving process only succeeding when employees are adaptable. 
Step 2: Provide tools that enable employees to collaborate in real time. 
Regardless of the effort in planning, knowledge learning in an organization requires 
people to make parallel collaborative decisions in response to unanticipated, unique, or 
complex problems. Facilitating collaboration is critical in a knowledge environment. 
Successful organizations provide forums to build networks and training in team skills, 
which foster important areas of expertise and responsibility, together. 
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Step 3: Collect process data. Capturing performance measurements provides the 
critical data to understand how the current performance is accomplished. A system 
approach to capture and implement periodic refinements to ongoing processes provides 
valuable feedback. 
Step 4: Institutionalize disciplined reflection. The analysis of collecting 
measurements is to understand what goes right and what does not to prevent failures and 
make improvements. After refining the processes, reflection is necessary to ascertain if 
there was a reduction in failures or realized improvements. This can be a difficult for 
organizations to implement since it may cause a disruption in procedures causing 
uncertainty, and difficulties with people accepting change. 
Fostering an atmosphere in which mutual trust and respect thrive is imperative for 
execution-as-learning. Managers should empower rather than control, ask the right 
questions instead of giving the right answers, and focus on flexibility instead of insisting 
on adherence. When employees realize their ideas are welcome in psychological safety, 
they will offer innovative ways to improve the quality of their organization thus 
establishing a firm foundation for the organization’s success (Edmondson, 2008). 
M. FEEDBACK LOOPS 
To understand how knowledge flows within an organization can provide insights 
as to the current state of knowledge. Complementary to Nissen’s multidimensional 
approach to knowledge flows, Sterman (2000) describes that effective decision-making 
and learning require us to become system thinkers using feedback loops. Systems 
thinking is the ability to see the world as a complex system, in which we understand you 
cannot just do one thing to solve a problem, and everything has a connectedness. Systems 
dynamics is a method to enhance learning in complex systems. Because we are concerned 
with the behavior of complex systems, system dynamics draws on cognitive and social 
psychology, economics and other social sciences (Sterman, 2000). 
It has long been acknowledged that people seeking to solve a problem often make 
it worse. Policies may create unanticipated side effects. Attempts to stabilize a system 
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may actually end up destabilizing it because the decision may provoke reactions by 
others seeking to restore balance initially made upset (Sterman, 2000). 
As an example, Sterman (2000) considers the birth rate in Romania in the late 
1960s. The birth rate for Romania was approximately fifteen per one thousand people. 
For various reasons, the government considered low birth rate a serious problem. The 
government responded with policies to stimulate the birth rate: banned importation of 
contraceptive devices, propaganda campaigns encouraged large families, modest tax 
incentives for larger families, and banned abortion.  
The result was immediate and dramatic as the birth rate rose to nearly forty births 
to every thousand. Government officials relished in their apparent success of their new 
policies. However, nine months later the birth rate began to fall again; four years 
afterward, the birth rate dropped to twenty, and by 1989, the birth as back to where it 
began prior to the implementation of the new policies to increase the birth rate (Sterman, 
2000). 
The cause of the birth rate drop after a sudden increase was because people found 
ways around the policy by using smuggled contraceptives, and women sought back-alley 
abortions. In the first few years of the new policies, deaths from complications of 
abortion tripled; neonatal deaths rose three hundred percent, and a twenty percent 
increase in infant mortality rate occurred. The policy became ineffective almost 
immediately after implementation (Sterman, 2000). 
The policy did not address the issues of why there was a paltry birth rate. People 
were having small families because of limited childcare, families lived in crowded tiny 
apartments, scare jobs and the consistently low incomes. Unfortunately, the children 
suffered the most from the population policy. Orphanages were overcrowded; child 
health care and services were over-stretched and limited, and HIV and AIDS became an 
epidemic due to reused needles in medical treatment (Sterman, 2000). 
System dynamics is an important aspect of KM and knowledge flows within an 
organization. People often do not understand the full range of influences that may affect 
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knowledge life cycle and the numerous potential outcomes as a result. As presented 
above, the decisions made in an organization to manage knowledge creation, flows and 
learning may trigger unexpected side effects. To assist with making KM decisions one 
must understand the feedback processes, stock and flow structures, time delays and the 
nonlinearly of events (Sterman, 2000). The most complex behaviors of knowledge 
usually arise from the interactions among the components of the system, not from its 
complexity. 
The dynamics of systems consist of an interaction between just two types of 
feedback loops, positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (self-correcting) loops. Positive 
loops keep the action continuing in one direction whereas negative loops create a balance. 
Figure 12 demonstrates an example of a positive loop and negative loop. In the negative 
loop, training requirements increase training; however, an increase in training reduces the 
requirement for required training (the more people are trained, the less people need 
training), which reduces training. The negative loop is balanced because it is 
continuously correcting. In the positive loop, learning increases knowledge, which in turn 
promotes learning. Alternatively, reduced knowledge reduces learning which in turn 
reduces knowledge. The positive loop is re-enforcing and will spiral indefinitely in the 
same direction. 
 
Figure 12.   Feedback Loops (After Sterman, 2000) 
Although mapping feedback loops for a particular process or operation can 
become complex, it provides an understanding of counter intuitive influences that exists 
beyond immediate observation. In a knowledge environment, understanding influences 
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knowledge through feedback loops provide an opportunity for analysis and 




III.  METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are circumstances in a Coast Guard C2 COMCEN watch environment 
where watch members experience a loss of situational awareness from one watch to the 
next. The consequences of these circumstances are a result of the loss of explicit and tacit 
knowledge during a watch changeover. This gap in knowledge can cause degradation of 
C2 performance and drastically affect operational response times to urgent situations. The 
Coast Guard has not yet explored the unique circumstances surrounding knowledge 
management and organizational learning in a C2 COMCEN watch environment or its 
effects during normal watch routines. 
This study undertakes qualitative fieldwork through a ground theory method for 
examination and discovery of how the Coast Guard C2 organization manages its 
knowledge resources. The design examines the patterns and details of work processes 
concerning knowledge flows across a C2 watch environment and discovers how it affects 
situational awareness for decision-making. The study is an iterative process of interviews 
and observations to collect the data necessary to conduct an appropriate analysis. The 
literature review chapter provides historical information on previous studies and theories, 
which provides a conceptual lens for guidance. However, the researchers do not have 
advanced personal knowledge of the individual participants or the C2 environment that 
may introduce a bias. Due to the nature of the qualitative work in this paper, the study is 
not attempting to offer an analysis on the quality or measure to emphasize cause and 
effect. Instead, the study examines the knowledge influences in the organization that may 
result in a causal effect. 
The practical significance of this study is to: 1. Examine the current knowledge 
state of the C2 COMCEN. 2. Identify the influences that lead to the cause of knowledge 
maturity and knowledge flows. 3. Reach a conclusion to answer the research questions. 4. 
Provide recommendation for future studies. 
44 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study focuses on examining the C2 COMCEN for the following questions:  
1. Primary Research Questions:  
a. How does knowledge flow within the C2 organization? 
b. How do knowledge flows affect the transfer of situational 
awareness knowledge from one watch-stander to another? 
2. Secondary Research Questions: 
d. What behaviors within the organization may contribute to the loss 
of knowledge? 
e.  What are the influences that affect the organizational knowledge 
culture?  
f. How can the Coast Guard improve C2 situational awareness of 
what it learns from the unit’s knowledge flows? 
C. PROCEDURES 
1. Location 
Coast Guard District Eleven Command Center, Coast Guard Island, Alameda, 
California. 
2. Participation Requirements: 
 Must be an active or reserve Coast Guard member. 
 Must be a Coast Guard Civilian Employee. 
 Must be assigned for duty to the District 11, Command Center watch 
located at CG Island, Alameda, CA. 




The researcher will conduct a knowledge audit in accordance with the knowledge 
audit process in paragraph C, 4. Approximately twenty participants are available to 
participate. The researcher will select participants from the available watch-standers on 
duty. All potential participants will attend a full disclosure brief on the study and be given 
the option to volunteer. The data collected will remain private and anonymous. In 
addition to official duties, the participants will answer interview questions and explain 
details of their work processes related to knowledge flows and work environment. The 
study will take place during the normal course of their command center watch duties. 
Private interviews conducted on the watch floor during times coordinated with the watch 
supervisor on a not to interfere with basis. 
4. Knowledge Audit: 
Knowledge audit is a critical knowledge management methodology to identify an 
organization’s current knowledge status. It is important for senior management to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of their knowledge position to manage their 
knowledge economics. Knowledge economics allows one to allocate scarce knowledge 
resources. Knowledge clumps, clots, gaps, best practices are issues that affect knowledge 
scarcity and influence an organization’s ability to use knowledge efficiently. A 
knowledge audit can serve as a basis for evaluating current knowledge performance and 
suggest changes for improvement. It examines the amount and source of knowledge to 
find an effective method of storage and dissemination. A knowledge audit is a planning 
document that provides a structural design necessary to address the specific knowledge 
details (either qualitative or quantitative) (Liebowitz, Rubenstein-Montano, McCaw, 
Buchwalter, & Browning, 2000). Knowing what data to collect for a particular 
organization is critical to obtaining relevant information for analysis. Then, the data 
collected and measured has to reach an appropriate level of saturation for the auditor to 
assemble a reasonable knowledge assessment. 
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It is also important for a manager to understand the effectiveness of processes. 
One only needs to ask pertinent knowledge questions in relations to organizational 
business: Are employees following procedures out of bad habits or are they conducting 
periodic reviews and measurements to ensure up-to-date processes for improvement? In 
addition, is it difficult to find an expert to answer a question or address a specific 
problem? The study will consist of the following knowledge audit steps: 
 Interviews: Appendix A contains an adapted list of recommended KM 
audit questions from Liebowitz, Rubenstein-Montano, McCaw, 
Buchwalter, and Browning, (2000). to acquire data either through 
observation or interview questions. 
 Survey: Appendix B contains a list of survey questions to obtain statistical 
data for analysis. 
 Knowledge Map: Develop a knowledge map to display the relationships 
of knowledge and knowledge flows between people and IT systems. 
 Knowledge Flows: Ascertain where and how flows within the 
organization. 
 Analysis of statistical data:  Several charts and graphs describe the 
results of the statistical data and inferences established from obtained 
observations, interviews and the survey. 
 General analysis: Contains a description of organizational knowledge 
behavior and processes that incorporate each stage of the knowledge 






The analysis presented in this chapter is a result of data collected from months of 
private interviews and observations acquired from the Coast Guard Eleventh District 
(D11) C2 COMCEN located on Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California. The first part 
of the analysis describes an overview of the D11 organization and a depiction of its 
mission responsibilities. A description of the D11 organizational chart delivers a broad 
view of the senior command hierarchy with a focus on the C2 COMCEN branch. A 
description of each position within the branch explains the watch-standers’ 
responsibilities, hence the dependence on KM to accomplish their goals.  
The knowledge examination of the C2 COMCEN follows the organizational 
overview and begins with describing a roadmap of knowledge relationships that produce 
situational awareness. In addition to the knowledge sharing processes, many other 
circumstances influence how situational awareness evolves. The knowledge roadmap 
identifies several critical knowledge factors responsible for supporting knowledge flows 
and the development of situational awareness. A description of each knowledge factor 
provides the reader with an understanding of what influences and affects the 
organizational knowledge processes.  
As with most organizations, the challenge is to transfer rich and powerful 
knowledge with enough quality to sustain situational awareness and enable action. 
Unfortunately, situational awareness sustainment is not always achievable, as it remains 
susceptible to decay. The analysis further describes, locates, and explains knowledge 
related issues within the organization that weakens knowledge, but recognizes where 
improvements are possible. 
At the conclusion, a knowledge map with a basis in feedback loops provides the 
reader with insight on influential relationships. The knowledge map serves to guide 
management with constructing organizational knowledge improvements. The map can 
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help locate where to implement change and what factors affect or become affected by the 
change. In addition, the map can deliver an analysis of feedback loops to assist with 
mitigating unintended side effects.  
B. ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW 
1. Mission 
D11 C2 COMCEN has the responsibility to serve as the District Commander’s 
direct representative in the execution of all Coast Guard missions and act as the Rescue 
Coordination Center (RCC) within its AOR. The C2 COMCEN takes a leading role in 
gathering intelligence, obtaining situational awareness, and planning with the execution 
of Coast Guard missions and a supporting role with partner agencies. It has authority to 
call upon numerous operational resources and coordinate with other Coast Guard units, 
partner agencies and the maritime community. Key missions as directed by the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard include (U.S. Coast Guard, 2007): 
 Search and Rescue 
 Marine Safety 
 Aids to Navigation 
 Ice Operations 
 Marine Environmental Protection 
 Living Marine Resources 
 Law Enforcement 
 Illegal drug Interdiction 
 Migrant Interdiction 
 Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
 Defense Readiness 
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2. Organization Hierarchy 
The D11 Commander, and four divisions of staff personnel comprise the 
organizational hierarchy. The C2 COMCEN location is within the District Command 
Center section under the Response Division. Figure 13 displays the D11 organization 
chart:  
  
Figure 13.   Commander District Eleven organization chart (From U.S. Coast Guard, 
2007) 
Division Chiefs: The senior staff encompasses senior officers, each designated as 
a subject matter expert in a certain field. The division officers manage operations, 
policies, and plans for its specialized missions within D11 AOR.  
C2 COMCEN: The C2 COMCEN branch is a collaborative collection of highly 
trained personnel working to obtain situational awareness and execute operations. C2 
COMCEN is responsible to provide guidance on COMCEN operations and policies to 
facilitate daily activities. The D11 COMCEN chief also acts as D11 SAR Mission 
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Coordinator (SMC) The C2 COMCEN chief staffs the watch with four watch-stander 
positions: The Command Duty Officer (CDO), Operational Unit Law Enforcement (OU-
LE), Operational Unit Search and Rescue (OU-SAR) and the Situational Unit (SU).  
Command Duty Officer: Provides oversight and coordination of all operational 
missions within D11 AOR. The CDO presents daily operations brief to the D11 
Commander and senior staff members. Ensures COMCEN watch personnel, Sectors and 
all other operational units involved understand their tasks. CDO ensures proper execution 
of tasks while remaining aware of the evolving operational picture with the ability to 
deviate from the plan in anticipation of emerging threats, needs and circumstances. The 
CDO oversees the interactions between subordinates and other high unit COMCENs. 
Interacts and supervises the COMCEN responses to inquiries from higher authorities, 
other agencies, the media, and the public. The CDO requests and coordinates other 
department personnel and assets as necessary. 
Operational Unit – Search and Rescue controller (OU-SAR): Primary 
responsibility is to ensure that all SAR conducted within the D11 AOR, executes as 
thoroughly as possible to meet all required mandates. OU-SAR tracks and monitors all 
active SAR cases throughout the D11 and Pacific Maritime Region. When necessary, the 
OU-SAR plans SAR operations for active cases under his or her responsibility. The OU-
SAR assists and supports subordinate districts and sectors with operational cases when 
necessary. As the SAR expert, the OU-SAR makes SAR response recommendations to 
the CDO and the SMC. 
Operational Unit – Law Enforcement controller (OU-LE): This OU’s primary 
responsibility is to conduct or coordinate law enforcement operations within the D11 
AOR in accordance with congressional mandates and Coast Guard doctrine. Law 
enforcement duties include prosecuting counter narcotics cases, prosecuting alien and 
migrant interdiction, prosecuting commercial fishing violations, and prosecuting 
violations of the maritime boundary line, exclusive economic zone, and territorial waters. 
Situation Unit controller (SU): The SU’s primary responsibility is to oversee 
maritime domain awareness for all maritime safety issues such as Port Security, Maritime 
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Environmental Response, Marine Environmental Protection, Defense Readiness, Ports, 
Waters and Coastal Security and Aids to Navigation.  
C. KNOWLEDGE AUDIT ANALYSIS 
1. Knowledge Audit Overview 
The examination of what influences knowledge, identifies knowledge processes, 
and discerning knowledge flows became apparent during the course of this examination. 
Through study, observation, and time, the emergence of knowledge categories appeared. 
The different knowledge categories and their eventual effects on situational knowledge 
lead to the creation of an organizational knowledge roadmap, Figure 14. It serves to 
facilitate and foster a systematic approach of analysis. Each category identifies and 
groups common characteristics of knowledge maturity, the knowledge life cycle and 
knowledge flows.  
The roadmap provides a visual display overview of each of the knowledge areas 
in the analysis. The knowledge areas are outlined below with a detailed audit analysis in 
the following sections of this chapter: 
Environment: The environment either supports or inhibits an organizations trust 
psychology. It contains attitudes and relationships from peers and management that can 
either encourage or hinder knowledge generation, sharing and situational awareness. 
Distractions: Distractions in many forms inhibits the flow of knowledge and 
maturity during moments of knowledge generation, formalization, and sharing.  
External Knowledge: External experts offer a unique capacity for knowledge 
with the potential to affect situational awareness. The desired result ultimately leads to an 
action or decision. Coast Guard personnel may not have the appropriate experience and 





Figure 14.   C2 COMCEN knowledge roadmap 
Internal Knowledge: Internal knowledge experts deliver the most valuable tacit 
knowledge for the organization. Although this is where knowledge clumps and 
sometimes clots. Without the proper knowledge management, expert knowledge may 
stagnate. The sharing of an experts’ knowledge is not normally part of the day-to-day 
routine, however, is usually available upon request. 
Pre-Assignment Knowledge: Each watch-stander has a certain level of 
knowledge from previous education and experiences. This knowledge is the foundation 
from which a watch-stander determines required knowledge to qualify in one of the four 
COMCEN watch positions. 
Watch Qualifications Knowledge: Watch-Standers acquire knowledge and 




Quality of Knowledge: The quality of knowledge (explicit and tacit inclusive) is 
a culmination of all knowledge influences. Explicit knowledge is easier to transfer to 
another than tacit knowledge by using written notes and IT systems. However, tacit 
knowledge, which is difficult to articulate, is more powerful and provides better insight 
for situational knowledge.  
Watch Relief Process: The process of transferring knowledge from one watch-
stander to the next for sustaining situational awareness transpires during the watch relief 
process. This discussion takes place in Section D. 
2. Environment 
As discussed in the literature review, the COMCEN work environment has a 
direct influence on the maturity and flows of knowledge. The environment affects a 
person’s experience and perspective. A watch-standers’ attitudes and interactions with 
others affect their ability to share knowledge. In addition, internal and external tangible 
activities occur during the watch that affect knowledge generation and sharing. This 
study examines the different issues regarding work relationships between peers, 
management, and other factors that either encourage or inhibit knowledge economics.  
To develop an understanding of the D11 C2 COMCEN work environment and its 
possible effects on its knowledge culture, a survey (Appendix B) provides the following 
data in a radar chart Figure 15. The survey asks watch-standers and management 
questions to rate a response between 0 to 5 (low to high). The questions cover three areas 
of the watch environment: Watch-stander to peer relationships, watch-stander to 
management relationship, and access to experts or IT systems to facilitate knowledge.  
Overall, the results of the survey from watch-standers show an environment 
conducive to knowledge maturity and sharing since most responses were above a 
moderate rating. The low rated questions (also regarded as the most needed for 
improvement) were KM effectiveness, adaptability, and use of IT systems. However, 
adaptability is intriguing because it represents the ability for the organization to change. 
The senior watch-stander for each position (called the position lead) is responsible for 
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implementing change. Watch-standers submit a request for change to the lead person, 
then onto the senior watch board for review. The appropriate Division Chief approves the 
change where it becomes an organizational policy. However, watch-standers complain 
the process is too lengthy and that most requests fall into a black hole. Many watch-
standers resist change, making it a challenge to standardize procedures thus affecting the 
transfer of explicit knowledge. 
 
Figure 15.   C2 COMCEN watch environment survey results 
The survey questions having the highest rating were; experts’ level of knowledge, 
group collaboration, and availability of knowledge. In general, watch-standers take 
satisfaction with their access to internal knowledge and their ability to work well 
together. The workspace environment is open with each OU position close enough to 
facilitate knowledge sharing but not too close that they cannot work privately. The 
position-seating environment encourages collaboration and socialization. Conversations, 
interviews, and observations support the rated responses of the survey. 
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There are striking differences between the management results and the watch-
standers. Management perceives the work environment in a better light than the watch-
standers. This should not strike anyone as unusual since leadership views the 
environment they manage in a different lens than those that work in it. The top two issues 
with the widest separation are personnel recognition and adaptability to change. 
Management appears highly satisfied and opines that no improvement is necessary, 
whereas the watch-standers view this as an area of needed improvement. There was not 
enough data to support either conclusion other than to say bias plays a large role in 
personal perspectives. 
3. Distractions  
During the daylight work hours, several other distracting factors hinder 
knowledge sharing and situational awareness. The COMCEN operations are typically 
more active than night hours because most people are active and working during this 
time. In addition to working active cases, the watch-standers respond to internal and 
external inquiries, (e.g. Media, local government, and mariners) and provide situational 
awareness briefs. Visitors (personnel not assigned to the COMCEN) enter the space to 
conduct necessary business. However, the meetings with non-watch personnel 
occasionally require interaction from other watch positions. 
Interviews and observations reveal COMCEN distractions as frustrating and 
hinder one’s ability to work effectively. At times, random people enter the watch space 
(forgetting the space is an active C2 COMCEN) and engage in open conversations or 
competing for attention with other OU positions. However, at times, there are personnel 
available to help alleviate the extra work during prolonged periods of high operational 
tempo. 
Several other factors distract watch-standers and affect knowledge flows. 
Occasionally requests for information external to the C2 watch such as private business, 
professional services, media, outside governmental agencies and the public result in 
delays or lack completeness. Situational awareness requires real knowledge in real time. 
56 
 
Several watch-standers made the comment of spending too much time and effort to 
obtain necessary information while attempting to maintain complete attention to the case. 
These efforts distract from the watch and at times convolute and confuse situational 
awareness until resolution. 
4. External Knowledge 
Access and collaboration among sources of knowledge external to the C2 
COMCEN environment is critical to acquiring situational awareness. Maritime domain 
awareness relies on external knowledge for details about a case or incident. Details, no 
matter how obscure, make the difference between life and death or millions of dollars in 
property or environmental damage. 
The public provides knowledge from four fronts. 1. The people personally 
involved in the situation. 2. Eyewitnesses. 3. Proximity to the situation and ability to 
participate. 4. Specialty experts such as academics. The C2 COMCEN supports 
collaboration with the public through the efforts of encouraging positive interactions and 
meaningful exchanges. The public contacts the C2 COMCEN regularly to report cases or 
incidents and inquire about maritime concerns. Since most of the DoD military closed 
their bases in the San Francisco Bay over the past 20 years, the C2 COMCEN is often the 
point of contact for national defense issues. Communication with the public is via 
telephone, e-mail, and maritime related websites. 
The C2 COMCEN CDO often provides details of a case or incident as the 
representative of the D11 Commander to the media. Communication usually takes the 
form of a telephone interview or via e-mail. However, the COMCEN learns much from 
the media as they will have access to information not yet acquired by Coast Guard 
investigators. The collaboration of sharing knowledge not only provides news for the 
public but also may provide valuable knowledge for C2 situational awareness. 
D11 command staff collaborates with many U.S. federal agencies and the DoD as 
well as foreign governments. Sharing knowledge and resources help to accomplish U.S. 
mandates of homeland security and homeland defense. Especially where blending of 
57 
 
jurisdiction is mutually beneficial. The C2 COMCEN serves as a means of 
communication and a place to coordinate operations. Expertise, intelligence, and joint 
operations of the diverse communities foster positive relationships and enhance 
situational awareness. Although the relationships provide an environment of mutual trust, 
cultural differences can affect knowledge sharing. Not unlike many organizations, 
agencies tend to protect details of their internal operations, procedures and policies. In 
some situations, organizational culture may inhibit sensitive knowledge that may be 
beneficial to all involved. 
Watch personnel occasionally experience difficulties sharing knowledge with 
external sources. The D11 COMCEN has a responsibility different than the other three 
districts in the Pacific Area AOR. The D11 COMCEN acts as the Pacific Area COMCEN 
as issues arise. This places an additional burden on the COMCEN and places one District 
over another known to create cultural animosity by other District COMCEN. Several 
personnel desire an additional watch section specifically for a Pacific Area representative 
to manage Pacific Area cases and monitor cases of all subordinate Districts. Watch 
personnel believe the benefit will standardize practices among Districts and encourage 
knowledge sharing. Organizational culture creates an environment where District 
COMCENs prefer to work in isolation and only share with other District COMCENs 
when necessary. Not because sharing is beneficial, but because it is a requirement to do 
so such as when cases cross district AOR boundaries. Watch personnel also share 
difficulties working with subordinate Sector units. Experience with the Sectors lead to the 
perception that they prefer to work independently and only provide information when 
requested or is a predefined requirement. Several watch personnel express the difficulty 
of receiving briefs and reports on active cases. This belief has a basis on personal 
interaction between the District COMCEN and the Sector COMCEN. D11 COMCEN 
watch personnel have the impression (from the Sectors) that information flows to the 




5. Internal Knowledge 
Internal knowledge with the D11 command typically flows without restraint 
among the employees but not without its problems. Specialty experts at the division level 
clump knowledge within their group of personnel. Experience provides tacit knowledge 
that remains clumped until needed by the C2 COMCEN personnel. Tacit knowledge is 
difficult to articulate and takes time to codify into knowledge for sharing to others. Other 
than policy, procedures, and doctrine, much of the knowledge remains in reserve and 
accumulates in one’s mind unless requested. Sharing explicit knowledge is relatively 
straightforward. Asking a direct question and receiving a direct answer often suffices to 
accomplish a goal. However, sharing tacit knowledge requires socialization, which is not 
common between watch-standers and staff personnel. Many C2 COMCEN staff members 
express their concerns that there is much more to learn from experts, however, not 
knowing what the experts know, and what questions to ask, reduces knowledge flows. 
Sources of knowledge in the surrounding geographical area do not share 
knowledge as well as expected. The D11 COMCEN exchanges and monitors subordinate 
units’ cases or uses their resources for events or incidents. However, organizational 
behavior and culture can inhibit knowledge flows. Although collaboration sustains at 
acceptable levels for the success of missions, limitation of knowledge flows still exist. 
The senior command will often only supply explicit knowledge to the subordinate unit to 
accomplish the goal. Whereas the subordinate commands provide explicit knowledge to 
the senior command based on what they believe to be their expectations. Knowledge 
flows freely within each organization due to mutual trust and organizational behavior. 
The mutual trust between separate commands is not as strong so the sharing of 
knowledge has its limitations. 
Watch Relief Process: The process to transfer situational awareness from one 
person to the next using tools at their disposal. . Several processes are available to foster 
the transfer of situational awareness. However, lack of process optimization can reduce 
the transfer success of situational awareness. The transference of tacit knowledge usually 
depends on individuals and their environment. 
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Ultimately, the study will demonstrate that knowledge influences, processes, and 
flows will determine the quality of situational awareness. Chapter V will contain 
conclusions that identify the circumstances behind the transfer of situational awareness 
and issues involving loss of quality. 
6. Pre-Assignment Knowledge 
Senior enlisted, junior officers, or civilian employees with prior knowledge and 
experience staff the C2 watch-stander operations. C2 COMCEN members report to the 
unit with diversified backgrounds of knowledge and experience. Shared experiences are 
conducive to mutual trust and collaborative relationships. The differences of knowledge 
between them facilitate new knowledge through socialization. 
The enlisted personnel are specialty professions with years of experience in 
COMCEN duties or related fields. Operations Specialists (OS) are experts in 
communications, tactical operations, C2 COMCEN operations, and SAR controllers. 
These individuals provide a wealth of knowledge that junior officers or civilian 
employees may not have. The prior knowledge and experience provide the bulk of 
knowledge needed for the D11 C2 COMCEN work. However, not all enlisted personnel 
have the same level of experience and expertise. Knowing is only part of the total 
knowledge and experience necessary for competence. Since many of the enlisted 
personnel transfer to the COMCEN from another location of the U.S., their experience 
lacks local geographical knowledge of the AOR and external knowledge sources. In 
addition, the specialty expertise does not comprise other knowledge specialties needed 
for proficiency such as the Marine Science Technician specialty (MST). The Marine 
Science Technician specialists are experts in port security, marine inspections, and 
environmental protection. MST specialists reside at the division staff level or the Sector 
unit where their expertise is beneficial. However, C2 COMCEN requires knowing 
enough about marine safety and marine environment to coordinate, collaborate, 
communicate, and monitor maritime cases and incidents. Several watch-standers believe 
that MST personnel in the COMCEN would give the watch-stander clearer insight and 
understanding of information he or she receives from external sources.  
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The LE-OU position requires different knowledge than the SU or SAR-OU 
positions. Typically, this position requires knowledge and experience in law enforcement 
matters such as Boarding Officer School and experience as a boarding officer, educated 
in maritime law, educated and experienced in organizations such as DoD’s Northern and 
Southern Commands and numerous federal and local agencies. The enlisted personnel 
typically do not qualify as OU-LE controllers because they usually lack the background 
knowledge or experience. 
The Junior Officer (JO) personnel have formal academic education with some 
operational planning and executive experience. It is characteristic for a junior officer to 
lack the level experience and knowledge the specialty experts have, but most are familiar 
with organizational management. Their experiences and training determine where they 
will initially work and identify additional required training. Unlike the enlisted personnel, 
JOs will usually qualify and work at each position. JOs use the C2 COMCEN 
environment to develop competencies for career development. 
Civilian employees come from a diversity of backgrounds and experiences. Many 
have prior experiences with extensive backgrounds similar to enlisted personnel.  
7. Watch Qualifications Knowledge 
Watch qualification knowledge is the acquisition of organizational knowledge 
with the intent to provide minimal standards to perform watch-standing duties. Personnel 
arrive at the C2 COMCEN with the knowledge brought with them and qualify to stand 
watch duties by attaining minimal amount of experience and knowledge expected of the 
job. Occasionally newly assigned personal will attend specialized training prior to 
reporting on board through a pipeline process.  
Watch qualification takes approximately four to five months depending on 
scheduling, previous knowledge and experience, and operational tempo. Civilian 
employees become a repository of tacit knowledge since they provide continuity over the 
years. Civilians do not transfer every two to four years as military members. 
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Several methods of learning for each watch position vary by knowledge and 
experience, not by processes. 
Oral Qualifications Board: All personnel receive an oral qualifications board by 
subject matter experts and fellow watch-standers. The purpose is to pose numerous 
questions and fictional and nonfictional scenarios to test and observe the applicant’s 
responses. The board will either give a certification of qualification or return the 
applicant for additional training.  
Performance Qualification Standards (PQS): Given a watch position, each 
person must complete a PQS program. Each PQS is a list of knowledge the trainee must 
learn, master, and demonstrate an ability to perform. Personnel accomplish PQS items 
through trainer instruction, observation, or self-learning initiative. It is also one of the 
prerequisites to taking the oral board. 
On the Job Training (OJT): OJT is training where the trainee accompanies a 
qualified watch stander to observe, learn, ask questions and participate in watch duties. 
The purpose is to provide an interactive sharing environment that fosters learning 
specialty knowledge with experience to develop tacit knowledge. OJT provides learning 
in policies, doctrine, procedures, and IT systems. Although the D11 C2 COMCEN states 
that each trainee shall accompany a mentor, this is not always the case. Several watch-
standers state that the diversity of trainers is better for learning because they will receive 
a variety of knowledge and experience.  
Specialty Schools: Specialty schools provide training by subject matter experts in 
an environment conducive to learning. In some situations, OJT is not sufficient to provide 
a person with the appropriate knowledge and skills. The National SAR School located in 
Yorktown Virginia is an example of a specialty school required for all OU-SAR qualified 
personnel. Staffed by Coast Guard and Air Force personnel, several SAR courses provide 
the student with knowledge and expertise in maritime search planning, coordination, 
operations, On-scene Commander, and SAR policies and procedures in coastal and 
oceanic environments (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012). 
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8. Quality of Knowledge 
As previously stated, obtaining situational awareness is successful only if the 
quality of knowledge is sufficient for making decisions and taking action. Each watch-
stander is responsible to attain this high degree of knowledge for codification and 
articulation. The transfer of knowledge from one person to the next is like electrical 
components that transfer electric power over a wire. Although the components and wire 
are conductive, the materials have natural resistance that causes a certain amount of 
power loss. Similarly, some knowledge diminishes when passed from person to person. 
Upon a watch relief, each watch-stander can only pass to their relief at most what they 
know. If the quality of knowledge of the watch-stander is scarcely sufficient for 
situational awareness and then combined the natural knowledge loss during transfer, the 
new watch person may lack appropriate situational awareness to conduct their duty. 
D. C2 COMCEN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS 
1. Watch Setting 
The D11 C2 COMCEN watch is in operation twenty-four hours a day, seven days 
week. There are four operational positions, CDO, OU-LE, OU-SAR, and SU. Each watch 
position comprises of a single watch-stander, either Coast Guard service member or 
Coast Guard civilian employee, with the occasional watch-stander in training. Additional 
personnel augment the watch during high operational tempo. The C2 COMCEN room is 
open and spacious with individual access to IT systems and communications devices for 
their responsibility. Other IT and communication systems surround the space for 
concurrent monitoring of diverse intelligence feeds and ongoing operations. When a 
watch-stander is not actively working a case or is not attentive to other on-call situations, 
they are monitoring information feeds, documenting what they know and sharing 
knowledge with other watch-standers. 
A typical C2 COMCEN watch environment is calm and manageable while watch 
efforts are regular and continuous. Occasionally, the operation tempo increases due to 
myriad of planned or unplanned maritime events such as joint maritime exercises, LE 
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incident, SAR response, or maritime security situation. Response requires acquiring 
information, planning, situational awareness briefs, decision-making, mission execution, 
and monitoring. 
2. Watch Knowledge Procedures 
Watch positions use IT systems and paper forms as a means of codifying data, 
information, and explicit knowledge. As a matter of practice, the knowledge repositories 
only contain required knowledge. 
A list of published reporting requirements as a policy to assist watch-standers 
facilitates knowledge flows between external sources and the COMCEN. The 
requirements specify what knowledge, from where and who should have it. Otherwise, 
the typical process of transferring knowledge between senior and subordinate units is via 
the pull method (specific information as requested) than the push method where units 
provide knowledge because the other might have an interest. However, internal to the 
organization, knowledge sharing occurs during the watch, typically with the watch 
position lead person, during midmonth meetings, and shared e-mail.  
OU-LE position relies on archival data by reviewing past situations and 
intelligence information that can generate new knowledge and sustain situational 
awareness. Historic information is extremely significant because it gives meaning to 
current knowledge and influences future situational awareness. The OU-LE requires 
people to have an extensive knowledge background on events and circumstances. Once 
qualified, OU-LE personnel usually remains to sustain situational awareness. OU-LE 
uses pass-down logs and computer applications to record and archive significant issues. 
The knowledge in this environment is dynamic due to the continuous political and policy 
changes. Whereas the SAR position manages open cases and rarely refers back to a 
closed case or incident. Completed SAR cases become historic archives, although 




There are quick response cards (QRC) and checklists that deliver procedural 
guidance for each possible incident scenario. As a matter of best practices, watch-
standers must refer to the QRC before taking action. Because of the importance, QRCs 
require regular updates. If a watch-stander does not take the time to review the QRC, an 
improper response may lead to unexpected results. This is a common mistake for the 
experienced and expert watch-stander due to over confidence and complacency.  
To avoid problems associated with fatigue, the CDO conducts a fatigue 
examination of all watch personnel to determine the mental alertness of its watch-
standers. Should issue arise, the CDO takes swift and corrective action to ensure a well 
rested the watch environment. The remedy is at the discretion of the CDO.  
Area and District Commanders - along with the senior staff – receive periodic 
briefs by the C2 COMCEN. All subordinate units provide their situational awareness 
using a template designed to provide information in accordance with policy. District 
COMCEN personnel compile the information; ensure its relevance and completeness, 
and then present according to the schedule requested. There is no training program for 
presentation although some CDO’s provide constructive criticism to briefers. Highly 
motivated briefers take efforts for improvements such as participating in Toastmasters 
meetings whereas others manage according to feedback from those with experience. 
3. Watch Relief 
Each C2 COMCEN watch position has its own watch relief process. During the 
watch relief, the off-going watch being relieved may use a watch relief check sheet that 
contains a description of cases (either detailed or vague). The lack of standardization 
enforcement (or in some situations no standardization) negatively affects the knowledge 
transfer process. According to several watch-standers, as long as information regarding 
open cases and other pertinent information somehow makes it to the next watch, 
standardization enforcement is not necessary. All the positions use IT systems to some 
extent for codifying case information. However, most of the knowledge documented is 
explicit only and there are instances of no standardized format. Other than process 
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standardization for SAR cases and other incidents, there is no standard for training on 
how to organize a watch routine for efficiency. 
The watch relief is a face-to-face experience with a verbal exchange of explicit 
knowledge, often referring to the IT systems for details. The watch-stander shares his or 
her tacit knowledge during the watch relief exchange. Prior to the watch relief, the 
oncoming watch will learn about all active cases and pertinent information. This provides 
the oncoming watch an opportunity to ask questions for clarification. However, because it 
is mostly an exchange of explicit knowledge, it is not until later, after the new watch has 
generated tacit knowledge that pertinent questions start to arise. Watch relief takes 
anywhere between 10 and 20 minutes depending on circumstances. Closed cases do not 
require much more than just mentioning although an active watch-stander will review the 
documentation for familiarization. Only active cases receive the attention of watch-
standers because a closed case is no longer relevant. 
Upon watch relief, the new watch stander immediately reviews all active cases, 
reviews chat boards, watch e-mail, personal e-mail, weather status and other 
informational items. This takes anywhere from five to sixty minutes depending on 
circumstances. After twelve hours of watch, it is difficult to have the off going watch stay 
any longer than it is necessary to relieve the watch. This explains the time and effort 
necessary by watch personnel to review active cases while on watch versus before watch. 
Occasionally, after departure from the COMCEN watch, the relieved watch-
stander remembers details about the COMCEN experience not previously passed to the 
new watch stander. However, this situation does not appear to apply to the CDO. After 
relieving a watch, the CDO rarely has a situation where he or she needs to call the 
previous watch to ask for more details. The CDO has the other watch standers to rely on 
if there are gaps in the situational awareness. Occasionally other watch positions will 
have to call the previous watch for either more information or the person relieved will 
call to relay information not passed. However, this usually only occurs when the watch 
was busy or had numerous distractions. The exception is the OU-LE position, because 
law enforcement often correlates with changing politics and policies; it is difficult to 
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grasp the situational awareness and all its implications during a watch relief. At times, 
conversations to share tacit knowledge during the watch are necessary. 
The SU position is the least standardized of all the positions. Watch-standers use 
IT systems and written notes to codify their knowledge. However, there are no 
standardized procedures to identify and capture knowledge. Instead, the capture and 
codification of knowledge from the COMCEN experience, is at the judgment of the 
watch-stander. The position does not manage cases, but responds to immediate issues and 
either resolves them quickly or forwards them to the appropriate authority (either external 
or internal). The watch relief process is at times, at the whim and judgment of the watch-
stander. He or she determines what pertinent is to pass on to the next watch and in some 
cases decides which method to use for documentation. According to several watch-
standers, the only requirement for situational awareness is for the oncoming watch to 
understand the active cases. The time spent reviewing logs, documentation, and historical 
archives for additional knowledge depend on the proactiveness of the watch-stander and 
how much situational awareness he or she desires to accumulate. 
The interviews offer a consensus that the most effective and efficient watch relief 
is by the most experienced and intelligent personnel. The combination of tacit knowledge 
and intellectual capabilities facilitates the watch relief process because they know where 
to focus their efforts to acquire knowledge quickly and thoroughly. Experienced 
personnel can immediately identify what information is critical, what questions to asked, 
and what issues are critical to the case to anticipate possible outcomes.  
There are numerous factors affecting a watch relief. Occasionally the C2 
COMCEN becomes inundated with people for multiple reasons that exponentially lead to 
noise, disruptions, and distractions. This creates an environment that is difficult to 
communicate, articulate, and focus on the relief process. A relief may take anywhere 
from five minutes to an hour depending on the caseload and the watch environment. 
Fatigue can lead to mistakes and wrong decisions especially at the end of the twelve-hour 
watch. The longer the watch relief process takes, the added difficulty it is to work on 
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current cases. Several watch-stander personnel support the notion that the level of 
experience corresponds to the level of watch relief.  
4. IT Knowledge Systems 
At times, it is difficult to communicate or articulate knowledge (internally or 
externally) because the technology needed is not available or is deficient. For example, 
Goldwave is software that extracts audio off a recording device. The process is difficult 
and takes time, sometimes too much time. There is a strong consensus to replace 
Goldwave with a more efficient system or improve the whole recording and extracting 
process. Another problem with technology is the inability to provide the SMC or external 
agency participating in the operation a visual display of the current case or operation. The 
OU-SAR has to contact SMC for approval of deployment of assets, coordination, or 
planning of a SAR incident. There are times where SMC orders searches and search 
patterns over areas not necessary because he cannot see the complete common 
operational picture. In the past, the watch-stander has had a disagreement with the SMC 
because the watch-stander had a better view of the situation. It is difficult to explain a 
situation or incident without the use of video or images. IT systems that share multimedia 
data would provide additional explicit knowledge if not tacit knowledge of the situational 
awareness. 
It is essential to validate acquired knowledge. There is no standard method of 
validating or testing the information and knowledge received. How to accomplish this is 
in the C2 COMCEN varies between watch-standers. Some watch-standers rely solely on 
their tacit knowledge and experience generating an intuitive response. Other watch-
standers prefer to share with others what they learned and how they perceive it. Then they 
listen for feedback.  
5. Organizational Learning 
The COMCEN uses several training techniques to ensure watch-standers are 
current on policies and doctrine and qualify personnel for watch-standing. The process of 
OJT training takes place during the actual COMCEN watch. Trainees stand a break-in 
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watch at the appropriate COMCEN position. The qualified watch-stander in the position 
is responsible for training the break-in watch-stander. The trainee keeps a PQS with him 
or her during the watch where the trainer will begin to instruct on each PQS subject. The 
training of the watch has no limitations. The COMCEN chief encourages trainees to learn 
any knowledge in addition to PQS, to produce a better watch-stander. The trainer 
instructs on a subject from the PQS then initials it to declare the topic trained and 
discussed. The trainee does not have to exhibit proficiency at that moment but should 
review and expand on the knowledge. The time for the trainee to demonstrate proficiency 
is during the oral qualification board. It is possible for knowledge gaps to exist and is 
never caught by the board during examination. 
The level of OJT varies by the individual conducting the training. The diversity 
training levels has a basis in the personality, intelligence, experience, and expertise of the 
trainer. There are individuals that enjoy training and sharing knowledge with openness. 
Others feel uncomfortable and find it difficult to communicate and share with others thus 
create knowledge clumps. Several interviews explained that all trainers are not equal; 
some have more quality than others. An unintended but positive effect of training is that 
the trainer reviews process and procedures they otherwise would not have done. This 
review not only reinvigorates knowledge but provides an opportunity for the watch-
stander to review for accuracy and improvements. Several watch-stander made 
statements that they felt uncomfortable during a break-in process because the trainer did 
not appear interested in training and often avoided detailed answers. The trainee does not 
have to demonstrate proficiency at the time of training. The trainer will discuss a subject, 
usually from the PQS, and familiarize the trainee with the required explicit knowledge. It 
is the responsibility of the trainees to follow-up on the subject for preparation of the oral-
board. An occasional OJT trainer would make assumptions on what to train and how well 
to train it based on a rough personal evaluation of the trainees background. If the trainer 
knew the break-in watch-stander had previous experience, the trainers would often skip-
over or briefly discuss certain topics. Although all OJT trainers have passed the minimum 
requirements to qualify in their watch position, there is no program to screen the quality 
of their training. 
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Numerous personnel confided that required training in the SU position does not 
align with the skill set of most people in that position. The expertise requirement is more 
than oil spills, marine safety and communication coordination. The experience and 
knowledge background of most qualified SU personnel is either communications or SAR. 
There are no Marine Science Technicians assigned to the COMCEN to provide adequate 
training and expertise. The PQS covers the topics necessary for the knowledge 
requirements of the position, but sufficient OJT is necessary to provide the depth of 
knowledge necessary to be a decent watch stander. However, as part of the training, new 
personnel work with specific D11 Divisions for instruction and later have access to 
knowledge experts. 
Once a month, the COMCEN provides training for all watch-standers not actively 
on watch. The management (COMCEN Chief and watch position leads) tailor the 
training to inform on new policies and procedures or to address a trend that needs 
attention. Occasionally watch-standers request training in areas of uncertainty such as 
inconsistent procedural responses, recommendations for improvements or due to a unique 
situation. The once a month training also serves as a place and time the management can 
speak with the watch-standers all at once for a face-to-face discussion of pending or 
future issues. Since the all-hands training incorporates all watch-standers, the training 
covers just general subjects. Unfortunately, the training is not available to those actively 
standing the watch. Some of the watch-standers feel training efforts were not adequate to 
justify their participation when they were not on watch. 
Watch position leaders provide monthly quizzes or exercises to keep their skills 
and knowledge sharp. The purpose is to inform on new policies, procedures, or test the 
watch-standers on unique scenarios. The difference between the monthly training and the 
position training is general training versus an individual assignment. A watch-stander 
receives an e-mail or document from one of the four position leaders with either a quiz or 
exercise for completion during the watch in a not to interfere with operations basis. The 
benefit of this training is that it is tailored to individuals and individual watch positions. 
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E. C2 COMCEN KNOWLEDGE MAP WITH FEEDBACK LOOPS 
The C2 COMCEN is a microcosm of a knowledge life cycle. Its knowledge 
purpose is to collect information and knowledge and convert it into something useful and 
actionable then disseminate as appropriate. With a KM program, it is difficult to 
determine exactly how knowledge flows and the location of knowledge clumps where the 
knowledge gaps reside. On the other hand, it is easier to determine the location of 
knowledge generation and transference through observation.  
Figure 16 is a knowledge map with numerous feedback loops for the reader to 
understand how knowledge flows within the COMCEN. The ovals represent variables in 
a feedback loop that affects an aspect of knowledge management. They also identify 
areas within the knowledge map where gaps, clumps, and holes may exist to either inhibit 
or facilitate knowledge flows. The arrows represent a connection between two variables. 
The thick solid lines represent tacit knowledge (or the potential to carry tacit knowledge) 
that moves slowly from one variable to the next. Tacit arrows represent the highest level 
of knowledge capable of transfer. It may also carry explicit knowledge or information. 
The thin arrows represent the transferring at most, explicit knowledge between variables, 
but at other times may only carry information or data. Dashed lines only indicate an 
influence or causal effect to the next variable. The dotted line represents the transfer of 
data and information between variables. The positive signs and negative sign represent 
the effect of the connection between variables. The positive sign signifies a positive 
direction, which means as one variable increases, it causes the other variable to increase. 
This also means that if one variable decreases, then the connected variable will also 
decrease. The negative sign means the variable will have an opposite effect on the 
connected variable. The only negative sign on the knowledge map is the variable labeled 
“distractions.” The negative feedback loop demonstrates that when distractions in the 
COMCEN increase, there is a reciprocal effect on the environment.  
This knowledge map provides the reader an understanding of which variables 
influence other variables and how change can affect situational awareness. According to 
this map, knowledge is responsible for achieving situational awareness. The model helps 
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demonstrate the different influences and causes that ultimately affect situational 
awareness. For example, the more data increases, information will increase, which in 
turn, allows for more knowledge generation. Another example is that when OJT 
increases, personal experience will increase causing an increase in learning, an increase 
in knowledge, and then eventually an increase in situational awareness. This map 
identifies that an increase in OJT will increase situational awareness. However, because 
the connections are positive, a decrease in OJT will eventually lead to a decrease in 
situational awareness. In addition, because each connection displayed is a thick line, the 
knowledge transferred is tacit knowledge, which takes time as it moves across space. 
However, the connection between OJT and Knowledge is a thin line that represents the 
faster movement of explicit knowledge. 
The knowledge map with feedback loops can facilitate the organizations KM 
program by determining where to focus additional knowledge studies. An examination of 
each variable can provide locations for a SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and 
Threats) analysis; determine knowledge clumps, clots, and sinkholes. The map can also 
provide locations of where to take measurements to monitor knowledge flows, capture 









V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarizes the purpose of the thesis and discusses the methodology 
used to conduct the study. In addition, the chapter contains conclusions drawn from the 
Alameda C2 COMCEN knowledge audit and of research questions annotated in this 
paper. Finally, the thesis ends with recommendations and suggestions for future studies. 
The Coast Guard C2 COMCEN organization is responsible for managing its 
missions and operations within is geographical AOR. The key element to accomplish this 
goal is to ensure a high quality of situational awareness from knowledge and information 
it acquires. Through the course of a standard watch cycle, watch-standers obtain 
knowledge and experience as they manage operations, share with others, and respond to 
cases or incidents. The knowledge and experience a watch-stander generates and 
accumulates travels through a maturing process of the knowledge life cycle thus aiding 
the development of tacit knowledge. Although it requires time to generate tacit 
knowledge, it is rich and powerful and helps to achieve sufficient situational awareness 
that enables action. Management suspects that—during the course of the watch or the 
watch-relief process—knowledge is vulnerable to constraints or degradation thus 
affecting C2 COMCEN’s ability to operate effectively.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the C2 COMCEN environment by making 
observations and conducting interviews for achieving an understanding of what 
influences knowledge quality. It is necessary to identify where knowledge originates, 
who has what knowledge, how knowledge flows, and which influential relationships 
enable a successful situational awareness. The literature review in Chapter II aids the 
study by providing the current knowledge research and studies from leading experts in 
the knowledge field. This knowledge supports the study by providing an explanation of 
knowledge mechanics, recommending knowledge audit procedures, and providing unique 




The study examines organizational knowledge behavior through a knowledge 
audit process in an attempt to answer several research questions stated in Chapter 1.   
The gravity of situational awareness and the effects of its many influences 
(feedback loops) determine knowledge flows within the C2 COMCEN organization. The 
knowledge roadmap from Chapter IV provides an understanding of knowledge sources 
and intermediary issues to promote or hinder knowledge flows. The quality of knowledge 
passed to the new watch-stander depends on several factors. This begins with the 
knowledge already known from previous education and experiences. Next, it includes 
knowledge and experience learned on the job. External information or knowledge from 
participants or eyewitness accounts is paramount to knowing the current situation. In 
addition, obtaining expertise from external specialty sources enriches knowledge and 
enhances the ability to take action. Another determinant factor is the process of 
transferring the knowledge, such as sharing the experience, case checklists and using IT 
systems. However, it is vital to note that the total knowledge and experience of an 
oncoming watch-stander also affects the ability to understand the quality of knowledge.  
The knowledge map identifies knowledge flows from specific sources. Tacit 
knowledge takes time to formulate and transfer while explicit knowledge travels quicker, 
but is less intuitive. In addition, the knowledge map identifies areas that do not provide 
knowledge but rather displays what directly affects the flow of knowledge. These two 
different elements—knowledge sources and influences—provides knowledge regarding 
feedback loops. By identifying weak links and problematic variables the C2 COMCEN 
can take measures to improve knowledge flows. 
The watch relief process affects how well knowledge transfers and how well 
watch-standers receive and understand the given knowledge. Because tacit knowledge is 
difficult to articulate, and given the amount of time it takes for a watch relief to learn, it 
can be assumed that little tacit knowledge exchange is possible. However, explicit 
knowledge and information do provide minimal situational awareness when combined 
with the tacit knowledge of the new watch-stander.   
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Figure 17 displays an example of how situational awareness cycles from the 
watch-stander to the relief watch-stander. The off going watch-stander retains explicit 
knowledge, and then over the course of the watch, acquires tacit knowledge. At the time 
of the next watch relief, situational awareness begins at the bottom for the new watch-
stander, because he or she has no knowledge or situational awareness prior to arrival. The 
new watch-stander then receives explicit knowledge until he or she over time attains tacit 
knowledge from personal experience on watch. The cycle then repeats continuously. The 
challenge of the watch relief is how to smooth the knowledge cycle so that situational 
awareness remains at a high-level quality and is consistent from watch to watch. 
 
Figure 17.   Situational awareness cycle 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
C2 COMCEN knowledge examination reveals several recommendations by 
watch-standers and the author to improve knowledge flows and eventually have a 
positive impact on situational awareness. 
1. Standardize and formalize the watch relieve process. Although watch 
reliefs use some standardization by providing explicit knowledge of active cases, the act 
of knowledge transfer is not standard thus creating knowledge gaps due to inefficiency. 
According to interviews, there is too much flexibility in the watch relieve process that 
encourages personnel to become complacent and not provide necessary details for a 
proper watch-relief. This becomes apparent when the new watch-stander spends up to an 
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hour after the relief analyzing available data to attain a sense or “feeling” about the active 
cases not otherwise provided. Several watch-standers expressed an interest in improving 
checklists to include tacit knowledge to force sharing of experiences. In addition, 
measurements to ensure high quality of a watch relief will aid in reducing knowledge 
degradation as discussed in the previous section. 
2. Many watch-standers believe that Sectors are a rich source of knowledge, 
but only receive knowledge as dictated by doctrine or policy. Also, there were several 
complaints that Sector personnel only provide information and knowledge to the 
D11 COMCEN after repeated requests. In addition, the information received is not 
always in accordance with reporting requirements thus adding an additional burden to the 
D11 COMCEN personnel. The recommendation is to improve the relationship between 
D11 C2 COMCEN and the Sectors for knowledge flow improvements. Perhaps an 
exchange program between COMCENs can provide a unique experience and offer an 
appreciation of another’s situation. 
3. The manner that a watch-stander organizes their work environment 
impacts their management of information and knowledge. It became clear there is no 
standardization knowledge collection and processing. Although there are a few required 
forms and IT applications, several personnel lacked keeping track of watch details. Not 
all personnel thought the check sheets were of value and often rejected them for their 
own methods of documenting knowledge. Other watch-standers found IT systems the 
most useful method to codify knowledge while it was fresh. Still others prefer the 
reliance on hand written notes and memories of watch-standers and only codify it at the 
end of the watch. A recommendation is to provide training for all personnel on how to 
organize their watch position efficiently, reduce clutter, maximize information and 
knowledge collection, and improve knowledge codification. 
4. Create a new Pacific Area watch position that monitors and assists all 
districts in the Pacific Area AOR. D11 COMCEN acts as the Pacific Area COMCEN 
when a case or incident requires it, such as when a situation crosses district AOR 
boarders. When such a case arises, it is at that moment that districts communicate and 
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share knowledge, not beforehand. Also noted, was the lack of standardization of 
knowledge between districts that create delays in situational awareness. In addition to 
monitoring the districts, the Pacific Area position can provide expert knowledge, assist as 
necessary, and ensure standardization across districts to provide real time knowledge for 
improving situational awareness. 
5. Improvement in the quality of trainers and training. The watch position 
leads need to develop training measurements to ensure all personnel receive the same 
comprehensive high quality training by high quality trainers. There is a consensus that 
not all trainers or training is equal. The study indicates that OJT influences knowledge 
and is critical to situational awareness. 
6. Increase watch relief effectiveness by requiring watch relief personnel to 
arrive early to review all active cases and activities during the previous watch. This 
ensures the new watch maximizes explicit knowledge and obtains tacit knowledge by 
“sharing” before they assume the watch. This will reduce the knowledge degradation 
during the watch relief process as discussed in the previous section. 
7. Implement a formal Knowledge Management Program in accordance with 
Commandant CG-611 requirements.  
D. FUTURE STUDY 
This study provides an examination of the overall C2 COMCENs organization 
and its knowledge environment. It serves to identify what may influence the cause and 
effect relationships of the watch, understand feedback loops and identify knowledge 
sources that affect situational awareness. Referring to the knowledge map in Chapter IV, 
a study of each variable and its links may offer a guide to determine future studies. The 
following are recommend areas for future study. 
1. Examine the training program to improve high quality training and 
consistency. 
2. Examine improvements for standardizing and enforcement of checklists 
for cases and incidents 
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3. Examine knowledge flows between the D11 C2 COMCEN and the D11 
Sector COMCEN for improvement. 
4. Examine the organizations innovation process and how can new ideas be 
managed more effectively. 
5. Examine the impact of having MSTs assigned to the COMCEN. 
6. Examine the impact education and experience if new watch-standers 
spend time at other units within the D11 AOR. 
7. Examine implementing new IT systems and applications to improve 
knowledge storage and dissemination. 
8. Examine how the organization may codify and articulate tacit knowledge. 
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APPENDIX B. KNOWLEDGE AUDIT SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. How do you rate the collaboration between employees where you work? 
2. How do you rate the encouragement for innovation where you work? 
3. How do you rate employee recognition where you work? 
4. How do you rate the level of mutual trust between employees where you work? 
5. How do you rate the availability/access to specialty experts where you work? 
6. How do you rate the level of knowledge from the specialty experts where you work? 
7. How much previous required knowledge did you have before reporting to this job? 
8. How do you rate the usage of information technology systems for managing 
knowledge where you work? 
9. How do you rate the level of sharing information where you work? 
10. How do you rate the level of sharing job related experiences where you work? 
11. How do you rate the training you received when you first reported to the unit? 
12. How do you rate the availability of additional job related training? 
13. How adequate is the training you received to perform your required duties? 
14. Rate the availability of the knowledge you need to access to perform your job. 
15. How freely is knowledge disseminated from specialty experts where you work? 
16. Of the knowledge that is available to you, how useful is it to perform your duties? 
17. In which area of your job do you feel you need to obtain more knowledge? 
18. What would you suggest to improve knowledge flows or learning where you work? 
19. How would you rate the effectiveness of your unit’s Knowledge Management 
Program? 
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